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I. INTRODUCTION
"The United States is the richest nation on Earth, with the most
powerful economy in the world. " 1 To a homeless person or family this
makes no sense. Current estimates of the homeless population vary
from a low of 250,0002 to a high of three million-about one percent
of the United States population. What is certain, though, is that
1. Remarks by President George Bush, Apollo 11 Anniversary Ceremony at the Air and
Space Museum (July 20, 1989) (emphasis added).
2. OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEV., A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY ON THE HOMELESS AND EMERGENCY SHELTERS (May
1984).
3. Magnet, The Homeless, FORTUNE, Nov. 23, 1987, at 170, 170-72; see also Alter,
Greenberg & Doherty, The Homeless: Out in the Cold, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 16, 1985, at 22;
Rossi, Wright, Fisher & Willis, The Urban Homeless: Estimating Composition and Size, 235
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their numbers are growing at an exponential rate.' In addition, home-
less people are themselves changing; families and children have
replaced hobos and skid row bums.5 One cannot walk the streets of
any major city without seeing a homeless person sleeping on a steam
grate, a family living in a cardboard tent by the river, or even a city of
homeless persons living under a bridge.6
Reasons abound for the dramatic increase in homelessness in the
United States: a reduction in the supply of low-income housing;7 the
SCIENCE 1336 (March 13, 1987); Smith, Homelessness: Not One Problem, but Many, 10 J.
INST. FOR SOCIOECONOMIC STUD. 53 (1985); Whitman, Shattering the Myths About the
Homeless, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 20, 1989, at 27, 27-28. For a discussion of the
difficulties in estimating the number of homeless as it applies to the 1990 census, see Duncan,
The 1990 Decennial Census, 23 Bus. ECON. 52 (1988); Wiegard, Counting the Homeless, 7 AM.
DEMOGRAPHICS 34 (1985); and Williamson, Up for the Count, 53 PLANNING 18 (1987).
4. See Galbreath, Assisting the Homeless: Policies and Resources, 43 J. HOUSING 211
(1986).
5. See infra Section IV for demographic data on the homeless. The National Coalition
for the Homeless studies reveal that approximately one-third of the homeless are families with
children; one half are single men; and those remaining are single women. Between 20% to
30% of the adults are employed, and about 30% are veterans. NATIONAL COALITION FOR
THE HOMELESS, HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA: A SUMMARY 2 (1988).
6. For a moving account of the effects of being homeless, see Coleman, Diary of a
Homeless Man, NEW YORK, Feb. 21, 1983, at 26.
7. The Reagan Administration's drastic reduction in funding for federally assisted
housing resulted in a 78% decrease between 1981 and 1987:
Year HUD Budget ($ Billion)
1981 32.0
1982 18.9
1983 14.2
1984 13.4
1985 11.7
1986 10.3
1987 7.1
NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 5, at 2 (citing figures comparing the
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") allocations from 1981 through
1987).
In addition, the inflationary period of the 1970's, while damaging to the nation's economy
as a whole, was a boon for housing speculators. The spiral in housing costs accelerated the
trend away from rental construction and home ownership, while the promise of capital gains
through refurbishing the old stock of housing led many gentrifiers to buy up SRO's-the sin-
gle-room occupancy hotels which had been the principal lodging for transient and low-income
renters. Smith, supra note 3, at 58. One study cited by the General Accounting Office
("GAO") found that one million units, or one-half of the nation's total SRO supply, disap-
peared during the 1970's. Id. For example, urban renewal has swallowed up about one-third
of San Diego's SRO's since 1978, and Atlanta has torn down 11 of its 12 SRO's for new office
construction. Magnet, supra note 3, at 170. What remains is housing that is no longer cheap.
In Los Angeles, an SRO that cost $100 a month in 1980 now costs $200. Id. Now, many
residents only live there for two or three weeks a month, until their money runs out, and then
move onto the streets or into emergency shelters for the remainder of the month. Id. Nation-
wide, a large number of SRO's were converted to cooperative or condominium apartments
intended for affluent residents, while others 'were demolished in urban renewal schemes.
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deinstitutionalization and lack of adequate care for the mentally ill;"
cutbacks in welfare spending by the Reagan Administration;9 alcohol
and substance abuse;'0 and shifts in the economy. 1 A corollary to the
problem of the growing number of poor and homeless people is the
issue of the effect of increasing the minimum wage.
Homeless advocates have long argued that Congress' failure to
increase the minimum wage during the 1980's, while inflation was ris-
ing, forced many people into poverty, and subsequently, homeless-
ness.' 2 These advocates hailed the recent increase in the minimum
wage which marked the end of nearly a decade-long stalemate
between the Reagan/Bush administrations and Congress.' 3 On
November 8, 1989, the Senate approved legislation raising the mini-
mum hourly wage from $3.35 per hour to $3.80 per hour effective
Smith, supra note 3, at 58. Low-income housing advocates predict that the effects of these
trends, although contributing greatly to the present crisis, will have an even greater effect in
the future given the long lead time actually required to open a new housing project. See P.
SALINS, THE ECOLOGY OF HOUSING DESTRUCTION 22 (1980); see also Smith, supra note 3, at
60. This crisis exists in the face of the highest rental housing vacancy rate in 20 years-seven
percent or 2.3 million units nationwide. Magnet, supra note 3, at 170. The problem is that
these units are too expensive for low-income residents. See generally Wright & Lam, Home-
lessness and the Low-Income Housing Supply, 17 Soc. POL'y 48 (Spring 1987).
8. Estimates are that 20% to 25% of the homeless population is mentally disabled.
NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 5, at 3. Between 1955 and 1980, the
population of state psychiatric institutions throughout the country decreased from 559,000 to
138,000. Smith, supra note 3, at 56; see also Magnet, supra note 3, at 172 (reporting that 10
National Institute of Mental Health studies in different areas of the U.S. consistently found
nearly one-third of the homeless to be severely mentally ill). Of the 2,000 planned federally
supported community mental health centers promised to support these patients, fewer than
800 were actually established. Smith, supra note 3, at 56. A task force of the American
Psychiatric Association found that "a substantial portion of the homeless (were] mentally ill
men and women who in years past would have been long-term residents of state mental
hospitals, but who now have no place to live." Id. (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
HOMELESSNESS: A COMPLEX PROBLEM AND THE FEDERAL RESPONSE 21 (Apr. 9, 1985)).
9. Since 1981, there has been a $3.6 billion cut in Aid for Families with Dependent
Children ("AFDC") funds, and since 1982, $6.8 million has been cut from the Food Stamp
program. NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 5, at 3. In over 41 states,
the combined value of AFDC and food stamp benefits is below 75% of the poverty level. Id.
However, the relationship between lowered benefits and homelessness has not been drawn by
the federal government: "The effect of budget cuts on the increase in homelessness has not
been quantifiably demonstrated." Smith, supra note 3, at 57 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, HOMELESSNESS: A COMPLEX PROBLEM AND THE FEDERAL RESPONSE 23 (APRIL 9,
1985)).
10. Smith, supra note 3, at 172.
11. Belcher & Singer, Homelessness: A Cost of Capitalism, 18 Soc. POL'Y 44 (Winter
1988); see also Magnet, The Rich and the Poor, FORTUNE, June 6, 1988, at 206.
12. See Minimum Wage Controversy: Pro & Con, 68 CONG. DIG. 129, 131-60 (May 1989)
(containing statements and positions of several Congressmen and Senators concerning the
increase in the minimum wage).
13. See Minimum- Wage Bill Cleared, Ending 10- Year Stalemate, 47 CONG. Q. 3053 (Nov.
1989).
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April 1, 1990, and to $4.25 per hour effective April 1, 1991.'4 The bill
also retained a minimum wage exemption for businesses with annual
gross sales under $500,000 per year."5
Opponents of the increase argue that increasing the wage will be
inflationary and cause unemployment, especially among low-skilled
workers and teenagers.' 6 Proponents, on the other hand, assert that
because the minimum wage has not risen since 1980, while inflation
has increased, the real value of the wage has been reduced, forcing
many people into poverty.' 7
The purpose of this Comment is to explore the effect of the
increase in the minimum wage on the homeless. Section II provides
background on the minimum wage and details its present inability to
support an income above the poverty level. Section III provides dem-
ographic data on minimum wage earners and a description of our
nation's homeless. Section IV outlines the minimum wage in terms of
economic theory and Section V exposes the fallacy behind using the
minimum wage as a measure to fight poverty. Section VI summarizes
empirical studies and evidence concerning the effects of the minimum
wage on employment and other variables, and Section VII reviews the
effects of the increased minimum wage on the homeless. Section VIII
explores alternatives and measures to utilize in conjunction with the
14. See id. Organized labor, the Bush Administration, and House and Senate leaders had
already signed off on the compromise before this time. See id. The House passed the bill (H.R.
2710) on November 1, 1989. See id. Earlier proposals included H.R. 2 (vetoed by Bush),
which would have raised the minimum wage to $4.55 per hour in 1991 and included a 60-day
training-wage provision for first jobs at 85% of the minimum wage, and the Bush proposal,
which would have raised the minimum wage to $4.25 per hour by 1992 and included a six-
month training wage applicable to all new hires at 80% of the minimum wage. Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-157, § l(a), 103 Stat. 938 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 201 (1988)).
Under a provision that expires in 1993, teenagers between the ages of 16 and 19 can be
paid a training wage for their first three months of employment. 29 U.S.C. § 206. Democrats
compromised on their earlier insistence that the training wage only apply to "first-hire
workers" (those working their very first job). See Minimum- Wage Bill Cleared, Ending 10-
Year Stalemate, supra note 13, at 3053. The compromise also fell short of President Bush's
earlier plan to apply the training wage to all "new hire" workers, regardless of how old they
were or how long they had been employed in the past. See id. The administration did succeed
in taking out a provision that would have set up a minimum-wage review board by 1992 to
recommend changes in the minimum wage rate. See id. Republicans saw the board as an
attempt at backdoor indexing of the minimum wage to future inflation rate increases. See id.
The training wage can be extended an additional three months if the teenager takes a second
job and is still being trained. 29 U.S.C. § 206. Under the compromise, no employee may work
more than six months at a subminimum wage in a lifetime, and the entire training-wage
provision will have to be specifically reauthorized by Congress in 1993. Id.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 206.
16. See Minimum Wage Controversy: Pro & Con, supra note 12, at 138.
17. See id. at 139.
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minimum wage in order to cure homelessness. Section IX concludes
that the effect of the increased minimum wage on the homeless will be
inefficient, if not harmful.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE MINIMUM WAGE
Congress originally set the minimum wage at $0.25 per hour in
1938,18 subsequently increasing it to $1.00 per hour in 1956,19 $2.00
per hour in 1974,20 and $3.35 per hour in 1981.21 During the original
debate on the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), President Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt stated:
Our nation so richly endowed with natural resources and with a
capable and industrious population should be able to devise ways
and means of insuring to all our ablebody working men and
women a fair day's pay for a fair day's work. A self-supporting
and self-respecting democracy can plead no justification for the
existence of child labor, no economic reason of chiseling workers'
wages or stretching workers' hours.22
When signing the bill, President Roosevelt noted, "Except for the
Social Security Act, [the FLSA] is the most far-reaching, far-sighted
program ever adopted here or in any [other] country. ' 23
Congress originally limited coverage of the minimum wage to
workers engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of goods
for interstate commerce.24 Over time, coverage has expanded greatly.
Table A25 illustrates this expansion.
In 1985, the minimum wage covered about seventy-three million
nonsupervisory workers.26 Major groups not subject to the minimum
wage included executive, administrative, and professional personnel,
18. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 84-718, § 6, 52 Stat. 1060, 1062
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988)).
19. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1955, Pub. L. No.75-381, § 3, 69 Stat. 711, 711.
20. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 2, 88 Stat. 55, 55.
21. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-151, § 2, 91 Stat. 1245,
1245.
22. S. REP. No. 6, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1989) (quoting remarks of President Roosevelt
made during the legislative debate of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938) [hereinafter S.
REP. No. 6].
23. Id.
24. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 84-718, § 6, 52 Stat. 1060, 1062
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988)).
25. R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS: THEORY AND PUBLIC
POLICY 78 (3d ed. 1989).
26. Smith & Vavrichek, The Minimum Wage: Its Relation to Incomes and Poverty,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1987, at 24. In 1981, when the minimum wage reached $3.35 an
hour, about 80% of all nonsupervisory workers were covered by its provisions. R.
EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra note 25, at 77.
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TABLE A: MINIMUM WAGE RATES UNDER THE FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACT OF 1938, 1938-1981
Effective Date of Nominal
Minimum Wage Minimum
Change Wage
10/24/38
10/24/39
10/24/45
1/25/50
3/1/56
9/3/61
9/3/63
9/3/64
2/1/67
2/1/68
2/1/69
2/1/70
2/1/71
5/1/74
1/1/75
1/1/76
1/1/78
1/1/79
1/1/80
1/1/81
$0.25
0.30
0.40
0.75
1.00
1.15
1.25
1.25
1.40
1.60
1.60
1.60
1.60
2.00
2.10
2.30
2.65
2.90
3.10
3.35
Percent of
Nonsupervisory
Covered*
43.4
47.1
55.4
53.4
53.1
62.1
62.1
62.6
75.3
72.6
78.2
78.5
78.4
83.7
83.3
Minimum Wage Relative
to Average Hourly
Wages in Manufacturing
Before After
0.398
0.295
0.278
0.385
0.431
0.467
0.441
0.465
0.363
0.423
0.410
0.430
0.402
40.417
0.403
0.403
0.478
0.394
0.521
0.512
0.495
0.508
0.494
0.531
0.454
0.445
0.449
0.440
0.440
0.445
0.435
* Excludes executive, administrative, and professional (including teachers
in elementary and secondary schools) from the base. Coverage peaked at
87.3% of the nonsupervisory work force in September 1977.
employees in some small firms, and the self-employed."
One perspective on the minimum wage is obtained by determin-
ing the real purchasing power of the wage over time and examining its
relation' to average wages.
The purchasing power of the minimum wage-that is, its value
after taking account of inflation ... is less today than at any time
since the 1950's. In 1985 dollars, the minimum wage was worth
just under $2 per hour when the legislation was enacted in
1938.... By 1968, the real value of the wage had reached a high
of nearly $5 per hour, but by 1985, it had declined to $3.35. In the
5-year period between January 1981-when the minimum wage
27. Smith & Vavrichek, supra note 26, at 24.
[Vol. 45:651
INCREASED MINIMUM WAGE
Graph 1: Minimum Wage Rate in Current and Constant (1985)
Dollars, 1938-1985
Dollars Dollars
0 I I I I- I I 1 10
1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
was set at $3.35- and January 1986, average prices increased by
about 26 percent. To have the same purchasing power it had in
1981, the minimum wage would have to have been about $4.22 per
hour in January 1986 .... The minimum wage has also fallen as a
share of average wages .... [Throughout the 1950's and up to the
1970's, the minimum wage was approximately fifty percent of the
average wages in private nonagricultural industries. In sharp con-
trast,] by 1985 the minimum wage had declined to thirty-nine per-
cent of average wages.28
It is important to emphasize that the minimum wage is specified in
nominal29 terms and not in terms relative to some other wage or price
index. The impact of this appears in the Graph 130 where time is
plotted on the horizontal axis and the value of the minimum wage
28. Id. at 25-26.
29. Nominal means in current dollars.
30. Smith & Vavrichek, supra note 26, at 25.
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Graph 2: Time Profile of the Minimum Wage Relative to Average
Hourly Earnings
Ratio of Minimum
Wage to Average
Hourly Earnings
MWo
..n?
I I I I
I I I I
t0 tI t2 t3 t4 t5
Time
relative to hourly earnings in manufacturing is plotted on the vertical
axis.
The historic movement of the minimum wage is depicted in
Graph 2. 1
Congress initially specifies the nominal level of the minimum wage
(MWo), which, given the level of average hourly earnings that pre-
vail in the economy (AHEo), leads to an initial value of the mini-
mum wage relative to average hourly earnings (MWo/AHEo).
Over time this relative value declines as average hourly earnings
increase as a result of inflation or productivity growth. The
reduced relative value of the minimum wage creates pressure onCongress to legislate an increase in the nominal minimum
wage.... After the passage of time (point t) Congress returns the
relative value of the minimum wage approximately to its initial
level. This process is repeated and the .. ,. time profile of relative
minimum wage values illustrated in [Graph 2] emerges. Although
it varies from peak to peak, the value of the minimum wage rela-
tive to average hourly earnings in manufacturing after each legis-
lated change has typically been in the range of 0.45 to 0.50 in
31. . EHRENBERG r R. SMITH, supra note 25, at 78.
[Vol. 45:651
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Graph 3: Poverty Thresholds of Income and Annual Earnings at
the Minimum Wage, 1959-1985
[Income in Thousands of Dollars]
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recent years.32
Another perspective in analyzing the minimum wage is its rela-
tion to the poverty thresholds published by the Bureau of the Census.
These thresholds reflect the subsidence-level consumption require-
ments of families based on their size and composition. Graph 333
illustrates this relationship. During most of the 1960's and 1970's, a
person working full time, year round, at the minimum wage would
have received an income roughly equal to the poverty threshold for a
family of three. During the 1980's, "full time, year round earnings at
the minimum wage have declined relative to the poverty thresh-
olds. ' '34 This is a result of inflation and a fixed minimum wage. 35 For
32. Id. at 78-79.
33. Smith & Vavrichek, supra note 26, at 26 (basing calculations on data from SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, 1984-85 ANNUAL STATISTICAL
SUPPLEMENT 68, 70 (1985); and Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census
(unpublished data)).
34. Id. at 27.
35. Id.
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example, in 1985, a person working full time at the minimum wage
earned about $7,000.36 As Graph 3 indicates, this income level is well
below the poverty threshold for a family of three. 3
III. DEMOGRAPHICS
In analyzing the effects of increasing the minimum wage on the
homeless, it is useful to identify first how many workers earn the min-
imum wage, whether their numbers are increasing or decreasing, what
gender, ethnic, and educational backgrounds they come from, and
what jobs they hold.
A. Minimum Wage Earners
In March 1985, approximately five million workers-roughly ten
percent of all hourly wage earners-were paid at or below the federal
minimum wage.38 This represents a decrease of one million workers
from approximately six million whose income was at or below the
minimum wage in 1984 and a 2.8 million decrease from the 7.8 mil-
lion workers whose income was at or below the minimum wage in
1981. Thus, while the minimum wage has remained constant, the
number of workers whose earnings are either at or below minimum
wage has declined considerably.
Generally, workers earning the minimum wage or less are
young.39 In 1986, approximately thirty-seven percent of minimum
wage earners were teenagers, and an additional twenty-three percent
were between twenty and twenty-four years of age.40 Percentages
declined as workers increased in age, to a low of four percent of work-
ers age thirty-five to fifty-four, but then rose to fourteen percent for
workers sixty-five and older.4'
Gender and education also appear to be critical factors in mini-
36. Id. 0
37. Id.
38. Id. at 27. There are a number of exceptions to the minimum wage coverage provisions
of the FLSA. Uncovered workers, include those employees engaged in outside sales work,
employees of low volume retail trade and service firms, and employees of seasonal amusement
establishments. Mellor, Workers at the Minimum Wage or Less: Who They Are and What
Jobs They Hold, MONTHLY LAB. REV., July 1987, at 34, 38 (citation omitted).
Roughly seven percent (about 3.7 million workers) reported being paid exactly $3.35 per
hour, and three percent (about 1.5 million workers) reported earning less than that amount.
Smith & Vavrichek, supra note 26, at 27.
39. Mellor & Haugen, Hourly Paid Workers: Who They Are and What They Earn,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Feb. 1986, at 20, 23.
40. Mellor, supra note 38, at 34. In 1984, approximately 60% of workers earning the
minimum wage or less were under the age of 25, one-third of whom were teenagers. Mellor &
Haugen, supra note 39, at 23.
41. Mellor, supra note 38, at 34. In 1984, persons 65 and over represented only three
[Vol. 45:651
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mum wage demographics. In 1986, approximately twelve percent of
women paid hourly earned the minimum wage or below-roughly
double the proportion among working men.42 Blacks and Hispanics
accounted for a slightly higher percentage of minimum wage workers
than non-Hispanic whites-about ten percent versus eight and one-
half percent.43 The highest percentage of minimum wage workers
was found among the under-educated." High school dropouts
accounted for nearly forty percent of minimum wage workers over
age twenty-five, while those with a college degree accounted for a
mere two percent of minimum wage workers.45
Minimum wage workers are generally not the primary wage
earners in a family. In 1985, about seventy percent of those earning
the minimum wage lived in households where at least one other fam-
ily member held a job.46 In 1986, just under two percent of husbands
and seven percent of wives earned the prevailing minimum wage or
less.47 Among women raising families by themselves, the proportion
of minimum wage workers was about ten percent.48 Other family
members, primarily sons and daughters, were more likely to earn the
minimum wage, with dependents accounting for just over half of all
minimum wage employees.49 Consequently, minimum wage is not
correlative with poverty. In 1985, most workers paid at or below the
minimum wage were not poor: only 18.5% came from families whose
income was below the poverty threshold; 11.6% had incomes between
100% and 150% of the poverty line; and the remaining 69.8% had
incomes well above the poverty line.50
Moreover, many poor workers are not covered by the minimum
percent of the total number of minimum wage earners; however, nearly 20% of this population
earned at or below the minimum wage. Mellor & Haugen, supra note 39, at 24.
42. Mellor, supra note 38, at 34. In 1984, nearly 15% of all women who were paid hourly
rates earned the minimum wage or less, double the percentage of hourly-paid working men.
Mellor & Haugen, supra note 39, at 24.
43. Mellor, supra note 38, at 35. In 1984, nearly 14% of the black population earned the
minimum wage, compared to 1% for both Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites. Mellor &
Haugen, supra note 39, at 24.
44. Mellor, supra note 38, at 35. In 1984, there was a direct correlation between
educational level and earnings; the likelihood that a person earned at or below minimum wage
diminished with increased schooling. Id. For example, among hourly paid workers 25 and
older with less than four years of high school, 10% were low wage earners, compared with six
percent who finished four years of high school, and less than four percent of those with four
years or more of college. Mellor & Haugen, supra note 39, at 24.
45. Mellor, supra note 38, at 35.
46. Smith & Vavrichek, supra note 26, at 27.
47. Mellor, supra note 38, at 34.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Smith & Vavrichek, supra note 26, at 27.
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wage. In 1984, the Bureau of the Census reported that 70.4 million
people worked at least fifty weeks, primarily on full-time schedules;
nearly 2.1 million of these workers were poor. 5' An examination of
workers classified as poor reveals that 800,000 were employed in
occupations not covered by the FLSA and, therefore, were unaffected
by any change in the minimum wage.52 Another 200,000 poor work-
ers worked only part-time for at least six weeks of the year.5 3 Conse-
quently, the remaining 1.1 million workers who earned the minimum
wage and were poor translates into a poverty rate of only 1.8%.. 4
Among major occupational groups, the number of workers who
earned salaries at or below minimum wage was as high as twenty-five
percent for service workers overall, and fifty-three percent for private
household workers.55 Just over half of all employees earning the min-
imum wage are employed in service jobs.56 More detailed occupa-
tional data illustrates that twenty-nine percent of the 4.5 million
hourly workers employed in food service jobs earn the minimum wage
or less, with about half of those working at stated hourly rates below
the minimum wage.5 7 Retail and personal service salesworkers also
had a high incidence of minimum wage earnings-16.5% in 1986.58
The proportion of workers earning salaries at or below the mini-
mum wage was highest in private households (forty-eight percent).5 9
Other major industrial groups having high percentages of minimum
wage earners include retail trade (twenty-two percent), entertainment
and recreation (nineteen percent), and agriculture (eighteen per-
cent).' Conversely, in many industries, such as mining, construction,
durable goods manufacturing, transportation, communications, and
health care,61 the proportion of workers with hourly rates at or below
the minimum wage did not exceed two percent.62
51. Id. at 29 (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CONSUMER INDEX SERIES P-60, No. 149,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS 27 (Aug. 1985)).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Mellor, supra note 38, at 37.
56. Id. In 1984, nearly half of all minimum wage earners held service-related jobs. Mellor
& Haugen, supra note 39, at 25.
57. Mellor, supra note 38, at 37. In 1984, the figure was the same. Mellor & Haugen,
supra note 39, at 25.
58. Mellor, supra note 38, at 37. In 1984, nearly one out of every four retail sales workers
earned the minimum wage or less, although it should be noted that many of these employees
earned tips or commissions that supplemented their earnings. Mellor & Haugen, supra note
39, at 25.
59. Mellor, supra note 38, at 37.
60. Id.
61. Id
62. Id.
[Vol. 45:651
1990-1991] INCREASED MINIMUM WAGE
B. The Homeless
1. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
Although homeless people can be classified into many catego-
ries,63 the homeless have been defined to include anyone whose pri-
mary nighttime residence is a public or private shelter, an emergency
lodging house, a commercial hotel or motel, or any other public
space." According to the United States Conference of Mayors, forty-
six percent of America's homeless are single men, thirty-six percent
are families with children, fourteen percent are single women, and
four percent are unaccompanied youth.65 As a group, the homeless
are growing younger; currently, one out of every four homeless per-
sons is a child.66 A twenty-seven city survey showed that fifty-one
percent of the homeless population is black, thirty-five percent is
white, and fourteen percent are members of other races or ethnic
groups.67 An average of forty-four percent of the homeless popula-
tion are substance abusers; twenty-five percent are severely mentally
ill, and twenty-six percent are veterans.68
A similar study of Chicago's homeless 69 found that the demo-
graphic characteristics of the literal homeless70 contrasted sharply
63. See, e.g., J. ERICKSON & K. WILHELM, HOUSING THE HOMELESS 11 (1986)
(delineating nine categories of homeless: (1) single male; (2) deinstitutionalized mentally ill;
(3) runaway youth; (4) foreclosed or evicted families and individuals; (5) battered women;
(6) disaster victims; (7) mentally ill with low incomes; (8) illegal immigrants; and (9) the
chemically dependant).
64. NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 5, at 1 (reporting that "public
parks, transportation terminals, cars, abandoned buildings and aqueducts are among the likely
places for homeless people to live").
65. U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, A STATUS REPORT ON HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS IN
AMERICAN CITIES: 1989, at 2 (Dec. 1989).
66. Id.
67. Id. The proportion of minority homeless ranges from 25% in Portland, Oregon, to
90% in New York City. Magnet, supra note 3, at 172. A study of new arrivals to the New
York City shelter system yielded similar data. Hopper, Susser & Conover, Economies of
Makeshift: Deindustrialization and Homelessness in New York City, 14 URB. ANTHROPOLOGY
183, 205 (1985). The majority of men entering the New York City shelters were black
(although blacks constituted only 24% of the city's population as a whole), and close to one-
half of the new entrants were under 30. Id. at 205.
68. U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, supra note 65, at 2.
69. Rossi, Wright, Fisher & Willis, The Urban Homeless: Estimating Composition and
Size, 235 SCIENCE 1336 (Mar. 13, 1987). The study consisted of two complementary samples:
a sample of persons spending the night in shelters provided for homeless persons (the shelter
survey), and a sample consisting of homeless persons encountered between the hours of
midnight and six a.m. in a search of non-dwelling units places on the streets of Chicago (the
street survey). Id. at 1337.
70. Rossi, Wright, Fisher & Willis classified a person as literal homeless "if that person
was a resident of a shelter for homeless persons or was encountered in the study's block
searches and found not to rent or own a conventional housing unit and was not a member of a
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with those of the general adult population.71 Homelessness was pre-
dominately a male condition: approximately three-quarters of the
homeless were men compared to forty-six percent male in the Chicago
adult population.72
2. EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS
In 1989, the United States Conference of Mayors estimated that
twenty-four percent of the homeless held full- or part-time jobs and
predicted that this figure would rise.73 These homeless represent a
growing number of working poor that are trapped between jobs that
pay too little and housing that costs too much.74
A number of other recent surveys reveal the typical employment
opportunities for the homeless." In Phoenix, Arizona, twenty per-
cent of the homeless interviewed reported that they derived a substan-
tial portion of their daily subsistence from salvaging. 76 Eighty-four
household renting or owning a conventional dwelling unit." Id. Conventional housing units
included apartments, houses, rooms in hotels or other structures, and mobile homes. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. Although the modal homeless person was a black male high school graduate in his
middle thirties, the percentage of homeless women in the Chicago study reflects a significant
increase over the percentage of the homeless women in the late 1950's. Compare id. (In 1985,
24% of the homeless were women.) with D. BOGUE, SKID Row IN AMERICAN CITIES 8 (1963)
(In 1960, virtually all the homeless people were men.).
Blacks and Native Americans constituted considerably more than their share of the
homeless, while Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites were proportionately underrepresented.
Rossi, Wright, Fisher & Willis, supra note 69, at 1337. The average age of 40 for the homeless
in Chicago was similar to that of the general adult population, but there were proportionately
fewer homeless of the very young (under 25) and the old (over 65). The educational level of
the homeless was similar to that of the general population. Id.
73. U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, supra note 65, at 2.
74. The Washington Post reports that, contrary to the perception that homeless people are
totally dependent on charity, a majority of the homeless men in District of Columbia shelters
work full- or part-time. Wash. Post, Dec. 4, 1987, at B1, col. 2. However, they have turned to
public shelters as a last resort because they are unable to afford private housing. Id. The Post
concludes that the District may be on the cutting edge of a new phenomenon: shelters serving
as public housing for single men who work and don't earn enough money to afford a place of
their own. Id. The Post also reports that in 1987, 83% of the 7,100 people who stayed in
northern Virginia's homeless shelters held jobs, most working full-time, but were unable to
afford a place to sleep at night. Wash. Post, Aug. 19, 1988, at Dl, col. 2. For other narrative
accounts of the working homeless, see Schwas, Jersey Housing Pinch Leaves Wage Earners Out
in the Cold, (Newark) Star-Ledger, Mar. 12, 1989, at D2, col. 2; Washburn, Families Forced
Out by High Rent, Low Pay, Hackensack (N.J.) Record, Feb. 19, 1989, at DI, col. 1; and
Abrams, The Working Homeless: Despite Jobs, They Still Need Shelter, L.A. Times, Dec. 27,
1987, at C3, col. 3.
75. See generally J. MOMENI, 1 HOMELESSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES: STATE
SURVEYS (1989).
76. Hopper, Susser & Conover, supra note 67, at 211 (citing Homelessness in America:
Hearing Before the US. Cong. Subcommittee on Housing and Community Dev., Dec. 15, 1983
(testimony of L. Stark)).
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percent of the homeless in Austin, Texas, work at hourly-paid jobs."
Most of these jobs were short-term and obtained through the day-
labor market; a minority (twenty-five percent) were full-time; and
nearly half of those who worked supplemented their wages by selling
cans, scrap, newspaper, or blood.78
In Los Angeles, twenty percent of the homeless reported work to
be their principle source of income, six percent listed blood banks,
and three percent listed panhandling.7 9 One-third of the sheltered
homeless in New Orleans currently work,"0 and in St. Louis, one out
of every six work, the majority having held their most recent job for
less than a week.8'
A study of the homeless in South Florida8 2 concluded that a dual
labor market exists. The first (primary labor market) was character-
ized by a formal system of wage and salary earnings. The second
(secondary labor market), in which many homeless persons are forced
to participate,83 is characterized by wages below the minimum wage,
paid in cash, so that taxes and insurance premium payments were
avoided.84
A recent District of Columbia study 5 found that:
eighty-five percent of those in the street sample reported being cur-
rently unemployed. Nearly all of the unemployed respondents
(ninety-nine percent) reported that they had worked for pay at
some point in their lives. More than half (fifty-three percent)
responded that it had been two or more years since they last
worked for pay at a steady job lasting three or more months.
Forty-one percent had not worked steadily for the last year. A
sizable group (twenty-five percent) had been chronically unem-
77. Id. (citing D. BAUMANN, C. BEAUVAIS, C. GRIGSBY & D. SCHULKTZ, THE AUSTIN
HOMELESS 125, 130, 139 (1985)).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 212.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. BARRY UNIVERSITY, THE SOUTH FLORIDA HOMELESSNESS STUDIES OF 1989: A
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS (Apr. 1989).
83. Id. A New York Times article depicted the life of a homeless worker in Miami.
Schmalz, Belying Popular Stereotypes, Many of Homeless Have Jobs, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19,
1988, at Al, col. 4. It described the labor pool that awoke before dawn to wait for the van that
would carry them to a variety of menial jobs. Id. at A14, col. 4. The labor brokers charge the
employers $5.35 an hour and while paying the minimum wage, deduct transportation and meal
fees reducing the value of the wage to below the minimum wage. Id.
84. BARRY UNIVERSITY, supra note 82, at 29. This is consistent with economic theory
suggesting that an increase in the cost of labor would spur the creation or expansion of a
blackmarket for labor. Id.
85. K. DOCKETr, FINAL REPORT: STREET HOMELESS PEOPLE IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA (Mar. 1989).
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ployed for six years or more. Of those surveyed, 77.6% reported
that they were currently looking for work. Various reasons were
given for their unemployment. The primary reason was the inabil-
ity to find work, followed by health problems and layoffs.16
The study also investigated the work histories of the unemployed
homeless and found that labor (thirty-six percent) was the type of
work street homeless persons most often performed, followed by ser-
vice work (twenty-seven percent), crafts (twenty percent), operative
(five percent), professional (four percent), and sales (two percent).8 7
In terms of vocational training, the District of Columbia study
found that twenty-nine percent of the respondents had completed
some type of vocational training.88
IV. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE AND
EMPLOYMENT: A THEORETICAL APPROACH
A. A Model with Complete Coverage
Any examination of the relationship between the minimum wage
and employment begins with the classical aggregate supply and
demand model in a competitive labor market.8 9 Graph 4 0 illustrates
the reciprocal relationship between these factors.
86. Id. at 32.
87. Id. Similar employment characteristics appear in earlier data on the Chicago
homeless. Rossi, Wright, Fisher & Willis, supra note 69, at 1338. Employment was almost
entirely in the private sector-government workers and the self-employed consisted of less
than three percent of the working homeless population. Id. Of private sector jobs, 34%
consisted of work in service industries, especially in restaurants, and another 31% worked as
unskilled laborers. Id. Common among unskilled labor were jobs such as dishwasher, waiter,
or short-order cook in restaurants, porter or janitor offices, freight handler, industrial laborer,
and hospital and nursing home laborer. Id.
88. K. DOCKETT, supra note 85, at 34. Types of vocational training included:
the entire gamut of occupational titles, however; close to two thirds reported
training in crafts and kindred related vocations. The particular crafts included
electricians, brick masonry, brick laying, interior decorating, wood crafting,
machinist, mechanic, carpentry, painting, radio and television repair, baker and
cook, and heating and air conditioning specialists. The remaining one third
mentioned occupational categories evenly divided among professional (surgical
assistant, engineering, and technical illustration), operative (welding), and service
work (cosmetology, janitor, barber, and shoe repair).
89. See E. BROWNING & J. BROWNING, MICROECONoMic THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
507 (2d ed. 1986); R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra note 25, at 13; C. MCCONNELL,
ECONOMICS 463 (8th ed. 1981); M. SPENCER, CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS 545 (4th ed.
1980). A competitive labor market, in contrast to a monopolistic or monopsonistic market,
assumes that the large number of employers hiring labor and the equally large number of
employees selling their labor precludes a single employee or employer from influencing the
wage rate. See id. at 31. It also assumes that there is perfect information concerning prices
between buyers and sellers. Id.
90. Adopted from M. SPENCER, supra note 89, at 545.
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The curves labeled S and D represent the supply and the demand
for workers in a competitive labor market. The upward-sloping sup-
ply curve91 indicates that more units of labor will be supplied at a
higher wage than at a lower one.92 The downward-sloping demand
curve93 indicates that a larger quantity of labor will be demanded at a
lower wage than at a higher one.94 If no minimum wage is imposed,
the equilibrium price at which labor will be bought and sold will be
W; the equilibrium quantity will be N. 95 In a competitive market, the
equilibrium wage (W) and the resulting quantity of labor (N) are
determined by the intersection of the supply and demand curves for
labor.96 If a minimum wage is imposed above the equilibrium wage,
in accordance with the law of demand employers will hire fewer
workers.97 The reduction in employment caused by the increased
minimum wage is referred to as the disemployment effect. 98 Thus, at
minimum wage 1, the reduction is JE; at minimum wage 2, the reduc-
tion is LE. In theory, the higher the minimum wage is above the
equilibrium wage, the greater the resulting reduction in employ-
ment.99 In addition, at the higher minimum wage, the number of
workers looking for work is increased to JK at minimum wage 1, and
to LM at minimum wage 2. This is termed the unemployment effect
9 1. The aggregate supply curve for labor indicates the quantity of labor services that will
be supplied by all persons at various wage levels. E. BROWNING & J. BROWNING, supra note
89, at 477.
92. See C. MCCONNELL, supra note 89, at 59.
93. The aggregate demand curve for labor reflects the marginal productivity of labor to the
economy as a whole. E. BROWNING & J. BROWNING, supra note 89, at 477.
94. See C. MCCONNELL, supra note 89, at 53.
95. R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra note 25, at 79.
96. M. SPENCER, supra note 89, at 32. This is referred to as the free interaction of supply
and demand. Id.
97. E. BROWNING & J. BROWNING, supra note 89, at 506. This predictable result is often
overlooked or discounted in the debate over minimum wage increases. Id. The legislated
minimum wage will affect employment in the sectors it covers only if it is above the
equilibrium wage. D. HAMERMESH & A. REES, THE ECONOMICS OF WORK AND PAY 126
(4th ed. 1988).
98. E. BROWNING & J. BROWNING, supra note 89, at 506.
99. Id. This analysis assumes that all wages are covered by the minimum wage. In fact
they are not. See id. at 508; infra notes 114-27 and accompanying text. One effect of
increasing the minimum wage is that work in the covered sector becomes relatively more
attractive than nonmarket activity or work in the uncovered sector. See E. BROWNING & J.
BROWNING, supra note 89, at 506. This may increase labor force participation in the covered
sector, causing labor to flow out of the uncovered sector and tending to raise wages in the
uncovered sector. See id. Another possible effect is that an excess supply of labor is added to
the uncovered sector caused by a reduced demand for labor in the covered sector, resulting in
lower wages in the uncovered sector. See id. Which result occurs depends primarily on the
elasticity of demand for labor in the covered sector. I. RIMA, LABOR MARKETS, WAGES, AND
EMPLOYMENT 321 (1981).
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of increasing the minimum wage. l°° In reality, however, the labor
market consists of two sectors, one covered by the minimum wage law
and the other not covered. The significance of the two sectors is
explored in the next Subsection.
B. A Model with Incomplete Coverage: The Dual Labor Market
Although minimum wage coverage has increased over time, so
that today approximately eighty-seven percent of all nonsupervisory
100. E. BROWNING & J. BROWNING, supra note 89, at 506. Official unemployment
statistics may not accurately reflect this unemployment since some workers unable to find jobs
at the higher wage rate may stop looking for work. Since the government records as
unemployed only those who are actively seeking employment but unable to find it, workers
who have dropped out of the labor force are not counted. R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra
note 25, at 80 n.22; see also I. RIMA, supra note 99, at 46
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workers in the private sector are covered,"0 ' many homeless workers
still find themselves in jobs not covered or exempted by the wage.1"2
Therefore, it is important to analyze a model with incomplete
coverage.
A model with incomplete coverage, developed by Ehrenberg and
Smith, 10 3 is represented in Graph 5. 04 Assume that wages in both the
covered sector and the uncovered sector are the same, Wo. 15 At Wo,
total employment is broken down into Eco in the covered sector plus
Euo in the uncovered sector. If a minimum wage of W1 is imposed on
the covered sector, all unskilled workers will prefer to work there. 06
However, the increase in wages from Wo to W1 reduces the demand
for employment, and covered-sector employment will fall from Eco to
Ecl. 0 7 Some workers who previously had, or would have found, jobs
in the covered sector must now seek work in the uncovered sector. 0 8
Thus, to Euo workers formerly working in the uncovered sector are
added Eco less Ecl, other workers seeking jobs there."° As a result,
the increased supply of workers in the sector drives down the wage
from W1 to W2.110
The overall effect of an increased minimum wage in a dual labor
market is to produce both winners and losers. I II The winners are
those covered-sector workers who keep their jobs after the imposition
101. R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra note 25, at 82.
102. See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
103. This is the analysis developed in R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra note 25, at 82.
See also Welch, Minimum Wage Legislation in the United States, 12 ECON. INQUIRY 285
(1974). For a more complete but complex analysis, see Jones, Minimum Wage Legislation in a
Dual Labor Market, 31 EUR. ECON. REV. 1229 (1987).
104. R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra note 25, at 83.
105. Id. at 82. Four underlying assumptions are involved in assuming that wages are the
same in both sectors: (1) prices are constant (real = money wages); (2) the market for
unskilled labor is characterized by a vertical supply curve; (3) this labor market has a covered
and an uncovered sector; and (4) unskilled workers move in and out of sectors seeking jobs
where the wages are highest. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 83. Alternatively, some workers forced out of minimum wage jobs may prefer to
remain unemployed until a job in the covered sector becomes available. See I. RIMA, supra
note 99, at 321.
109. R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra note 25, at 83. This assumes that there are
sufficient jobs available in the uncovered sector to accommodate the influx of displaced
workers from the covered sector.
110. Id. An alternative hypothesis is that the higher wage rate in the covered sector may
cause the wage rate in the uncovered sector to rise as workers flow out of the uncovered sector.
I. RIMA, supra note 99, at 321.
111. R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra note 25, at 83; see also Welch, supra note 103, at
285.
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of the higher minimum wage." 2 The losers are of two types: low-
skilled workers who lose their jobs in the covered sector and are now
paid lower wages in the uncovered sector, 1 3 and low-skilled workers
in the uncovered sector who keep their jobs but now find their real
112. R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra note 25, at 83.
113. Id.
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wages depressed by the increased supply of labor to that sector."14
Even in this model, where there is no effect on overall employment,
any net gain in welfare depends upon the difference between winners
and losers.
C. Marginal Productivity, Elasticity, and Substitution
1. MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY THEORY
The relationship between the minimum wage and employment
illustrated by the supply and demand model must be taken a step fur-
ther and analyzed in terms of the marginal product of labor
("MPL")-the additional output that can be produced by a firm
when it employs one additional unit of labor, with capital held con-
stant." 5 Employers hire resources on the basis of the contribution
those resources will make towards output." 6 The additional revenue
secured by using one more unit of labor is called the marginal revenue
of labor (MR/) and the additional cost of one additional unit of labor
is the marginal cost (MCI). I7 If an employer wants to increase his
wealth, he will hire only those resources whose value to his operation
is expected to exceed their additional cost." 8 Similarly, if a firm's
marginal revenue is less than its marginal cost, the firm loses money
on the last unit of labor hired, and would increase its profits by reduc-
ing employment.'9
In practical terms, an increase in the legal minimum wage will
raise the marginal cost of some employees to their employers.' 20
Thus, workers whose marginal productivity is below their marginal
cost often will be laid off or not replaced, and some employers will
hire new workers.' 2 1
114. Id.
115. P. HEYNE, THE ECONOMIC WAY OF THINKING 170 (2d ed. 1976); see R. EHRENBERG
& R. SMITH, supra note 25, at 56; I RIMA, supra note 99, at 1 II (stating that "as increasing
quantities of labor are applied to a fixed factor of production, the resulting additions to output
will eventually decrease"); see also L. REYNOLDS, LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR
RELATIONS 90 (6th ed. 1974) (same). This principle is referred to as the law of diminishing
returns. Id.
116. P. HEYNE, supra note 115, at 170.
117. L. REYNOLDS, supra note 115, at 91.
118. See id.
119. R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra note 25, at 58. For a discussion of the objections
to the marginal productivity theory of demand, see G. BLOOM & H. NORTHRUP, ECONOMICS
OF LABOR RELATIONS 349, 352 (9th ed. 1981) (suggesting that the theory does not accurately
reflect the way businessmen think; the labor market functions differently than the ordinary
product market and firms do not maximize profits); see also Cain, The Challenge of Segmented
Labor Market Theories to Orthodox Theory, 14 J. ECON. LIT. 1215 (1976).
120. P. HEYNE, supra note 115, at 170.
121. Id. at 171. Two groups are characterized by marginal productivities so low that they
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2. ELASTICITY OF DEMAND
The law of demand predicts that employers will respond to wage
increases above the equilibrium wage by hiring less labor. The degree
of employer responsiveness to wage changes can vary considerably
from industry to industry and between different wage ranges."'2 This
responsiveness is measured by the elasticity of demand for labor.'2 3
The demand for some labor is such that employers are relatively
responsive to wage changes, i.e., modest price changes give rise to
considerable changes in the quantity of labor demanded. The demand
for this labor is elastic.' 24 For other types of labor, employers are
relatively unresponsive to wage changes, i.e., substantial wage
changes result in modest changes in the quantity of labor demanded.
In such cases demand is inelastic. 125 For example, if a two percent
will be severely hurt by increases in the minimum wage: teenagers and unskilled workers. See
The Real Cost of a Higher Minimum Wage, Bus. WEEK, July 27, 1987, at 64. On the basis of
this analysis, opponents of the minimum wage conclude that legally set wage floors cause
unemployment, and that the workers who become unemployed are those whose productivities
are not high enough to earn the legal minimum. See Minimum Wage Myths, NATION'S Bus.,
June 1987, at 35. As a result, they either remain permanently unemployed or seek work in
low-wage marginal industries not covered by the minimum wage law, thereby depressing
wages in those industries still further. Id. at 36. This conclusion, however, is not uniformly
accepted. See Hawkins, Increasing the Minimum Wage Makes Good Economic Policy,
PERSONNEL J., July 1987, at 12.
Conversely, proponents of the use of the minimum wage as a means of alleviating poverty
assert that the market for labor ii not as competitive as the supply and demand model assumes.
See C. MCCONNELL, supra note 89, at 615. Instead, they claim that there is a high degree of
employer monopsony-monopolistic power-in the hiring of resources. Id. As a result,
employers are able to exploit low-skilled workers by paying them less that their productivities
warrant. Id. Further, although increasing the minimum wage raises both consumer
purchasing power and production costs, low-income workers spend their increased wages
quickly. Hawkins, supra, at 15. This creates amplified increases in consumption and income
which more than offset the rise in production costs, thereby stimulating a higher, rather than
lower, level of employment. Id. In addition, enforced higher wages encourage employers to
develop better ways of utilizing their resources. C. MCCONNELL, supra note 89, at 615. This
shock effect leads to improvements in efficiency which further offset any increase in production
costs. Id. The debate between the two views and its particular application to the homeless is
the central theme of this Comment.
122. L. REYNOLDS, supra note 115, at 93. For empirical evidence on wage elasticities of
demand, see R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra note 25, at 99-102.
123. R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra note 25, at 99. The degree of elasticity or
inelasticity is measured by the elasticity coefficient, or Ed, represented in this formula:
percentage change
in employmentEd =
percentage change
in wage rate
Id.
124. See id. at 100.
125. Id.
INCREASED MINIMUM WAGE
increase in wage results in a four percent decrease in the quantity of
labor demanded, the demand is elastic, with a coefficient of two. Sim-
ilarly, if a given percentage change in wage is accompanied by a rela-
tively smaller change in the quantity demanded-for example, a two
percent increase in wage resulting in a one percent decrease in quan-
tity demanded--demand is inelastic.' 26
The concept of elasticity predicts that the higher the elasticity
coefficient for labor is, the greater the impact an imposition of a mini-
mum wage above the equilibrium wage will have on employment.' 27
If demand is elastic, aggregate earnings12 will decline when the wage
rate increases because the decrease in employment is greater than the
increase in wage. 12 9 Conversely, if demand is inelastic, aggregate
earnings will increase when the wage rate is increased. 3 ' Graph 6131
illustrates this concept.
The flatter of the two demand curves (DI) has a greater elastic-
ity than the steeper curve (D2).132  Starting at any wage (W), any
wage change (to W') will yield greater responses in employment with
demand curve D1 than on D2 (compare El less E'I with E2 lessET2). 1 3 3
3. SUBSTITUTION
As the price of labor increases, firms have an incentive to substi-
tute other, relatively cheaper, inputs. 134  In the short run, capital is
126. Id. Where the percentage change in price equals the percentage change in quantity
demanded, the demand is said to be unit elastic. In the extreme situation where demand is
either completely unresponsive or completely responsive to price changes, the demand is said
to be perfectly inelastic or perfectly elastic. Labor economists usually focus on whether the
absolute value of the elasticity of demand is greater than or less than one (an elasticity
coefficient of greater than one being elastic and a coefficient of less than one being inelastic).
Id.
127. The factors that influence elasticity can be summarized by the four Hicks-Marshall
Laws of Derived Demand. J. HICKS, THE THEORY OF WAGES 241 (2d ed. 1966)
(incorporating A. MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 518 (8th ed. 1923)). These laws
assert that, other things being equal, the elasticity of demand for labor is high under the
following conditions: (1) when the price elasticity of demand for the product being produced
is high; (2) when other factors of production can be easily substituted for labor; (3) when the
supply of other factors of production is highly elastic; and (4) when the cost of employing labor
is a large share of the total cost of production. J. HICKS, supra; A. MARSHALL, supra.
128. Aggregate earnings are defined as the wage rate multiplied by the employment level.
R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra note 25, at 100.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 101.
132. Id. at 100.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 103. These other inputs include capital and different qualities of labor. Id. at
104.
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Graph 6: Relative Demand Elasticities
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fixed and cannot be substituted for labor.135 In the long run,136 how-
ever, substitution is possible. 37 The substitutability of capital and
labor is measured by the elasticity of substitution, which is defined as
"the percentage change in the capital/labor ratio [caused] by a 1 per-
cent change in the ratio of wages to capital costs. 1 3 1
In the production function (labor plus capital), labor can be sub-
stituted for by capital or different kinds of labor. ' 39 The input combi-
nation chosen is that which will produce the desired output at the
lowest cost.' Given the cost of capital, r, and the wage rate, w, a
135. D. HAMERMESH & A. REES, supra note 97, at 112.
136. In this analysis, "long run" is defined as the "period of time that is sufficient to allow a
firm to adjust both labor and the amount of capital services to new market conditions." Id.
137. Id.
138. R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra note 25, at 123.
139. L. REYNOLDS, supra note 115, at 257. But see D. HAMERMESH & A. REES, supra note
97, at 115 (providing examples of situations in which substitution is difficult or impossible to
make, e.g., a labor-intensive industry).
In addition to a choice between labor and capital, firms also face the choice between
domestic and foreign production. The increased wage could cause firms to shift production
overseas in search of cheaper labor, thus causing obvious employment effects. Id. at 116.
140. See D. HAMERMESH & A. REES, supra note 97, at 114. This conclusion about the
demand for labor is premised on three assumptions: (1) that the firm's behavior is governed by
the object of maximizing its profits; (2) that the firm alters its capital-labor mix in response to
changes in the relative prices of labor and capital; and (3) that the wage at which labor is
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firm will minimize the cost of a given level of output by combining the
factors so that the marginal product of capital equals the marginal
product of labor. 4 '
A firm's equilibrium input of labor and capital is thus repre-
sented by
(MPI w) 142
MPk r
The imposition of a minimum wage changes the relationship between
the marginal product of labor and the wage rate and is represented by
MPI MPk ) 143
w r
Thus, the marginal product of an additional dollar's worth of labor
becomes less than the marginal product of an additional dollar's
worth of capital. Employers react to this change by substituting
capital for labor until equilibrium is attained, MPI = MPk.'
Therefore, the elasticity of demand is greatly determined by a firm's
ability to substitute capital for labor. If this substitution is easily
made, an increase in w will have a dramatic effect on employment.
Conversely, if the substitution is difficult or impossible to make, an
employed is given to the firm, i.e., that the firm is a price-taker in its factor market. See id. at
119.
141. Id. at 114.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. L. REYNOLDS, supra note 115, at 108. Moreover, output itself will fall because higher
production costs lead to higher product prices and reduced sales. Id. "Unemployment may
show up particularly in the demise of marginal producers who cannot survive at the new wage
level." Id. These predictions are not uniform and have been attacked by the critics of
marginal productivity theory. For instance, according to the efficiency-wage hypothesis,
workers may express their satisfaction with wage increases by expanding their effort and
reducing their propensity to leave the firm and impose turnover costs on their employers. See
Yellen, Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 200 (1984); see also
Raff & Summers, Did Henry Ford Pay Efficiency Wages?, 5 J. LAs. ECON. 102 (1987).
Additionally, advocates of the minimum wage argue that every firm operates with some slack
or inefficiency in the productive use of labor which can be reduced when the firm is threatened
by higher labor costs (shock effect). C. MCCONNELL, supra note 89, at 615. This argument,
however, can be criticized on two grounds. First, "increases in the minimum wage have come
quite often, and although they are not regular, they are not unexpected." D. HAMERMESH &
A. REES, supra note 97, at 148. Second, "[empirical] ... evidence that the minimum wage
does reduce employment indicates that if the shock effect exists, it is outweighed by the more
conventional effects induced by a downward-sloping labor demand curve." Id.
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increase in w will little effect on employment, assuming that output
remains constant.
D. Welfare Economics
Since the imposition of a minimum wage is intended to benefit
society, the concept of welfare economics must be analyzed. This
branch of economics is concerned with the development of principles
for maximizing society's satisfaction, i.e., it social welfare. 45 The
goal of the theory is Pareto optimality,"16 a condition which exists
where no change can be implemented that will make someone better
off without making someone else worse off.' 47 This concept leads to
two important principles: (1) any social action that benefits at least
one person without harming someone else will clearly increase social
welfare, and therefore should be undertaken; and (2) the effect on
social welfare of any action that benefits some while harming others
cannot be determined because we cannot compare satisfactions and
dissatisfactions among people. 48 The first principle involves a useful,
but obvious guide to social policy. The second, however, is more
interesting because any conclusion concerning the net gain or loss in
social welfare attributable to a particular minimum wage policy is
incapable of verification because of the inherent uncertainty in the
second principle. Therefore, it is important to realize the limitations
on any conclusion when one attempts to put a value on another's util-
ity. One can, however, attempt to predict whether the benefits will
out-weigh the costs for a particular group, i.e., the homeless. This is
achieved by observing characteristics of the study group (the home-
less) and comparing them to other previously studied groups.
The minimum wage has thus far been shown to be incapable of
providing adequate financial support to wage earners in today's eco-
nomic conditions. 149 These wage earners, however, have been shown
as primarily not poor or not the primary wage earner in the family.1
5 0
Additionally, a great number of poor are not minimum wage earners,
and therefore are unaffected by any change in the minimum wage. 151
The homeless have been shown to be of a spectrum of character-
145. M. SPENCER, supra note 89, at 486.
146. The concept "Pareto optimality" is named after the Italian economist, Vilfredo Pareto
(1848-1923), who first systematically formulated this theory. See E. BROWNING & J.
BROWNING, supra note 89, at 148 n.2.
147. Id. at 569.
148. M. SPENCER, supra note 89, at 488.
149. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
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istiCS.152 In terms of employment, many homeless people work either
full- or part-time.'53 Many of these jobs, however, are not covered by
the minimum wage law.1 54 By combining the general characteristics
of minimum wage earners with those of working homeless, the result
is one group that is either not poor or not covered by the minimum
wage at all and a second group that works at minimum wage jobs and
are poor. Assuming that the goals of the minimum wage increase are
to improve social welfare and to reduce poverty, the minimum wage
will only have a direct effect on the second group. The remaining
portion of this Comment will disprove the argument that minimum
wage increases have helped both minimum wage earners and the over-
all economy.
V. THE FALLACY OF THE MINIMUM WAGE
Proponents of increasing the minimum wage put forward the fol-
lowing argument: Each time the minimum wage has been raised total
employment has continued to grow. Therefore, those who claim that
increasing the minimum wage causes unemployment are simply not
correct. 1
55
The premise of this argument is factually correct. The data con-
tained in Tables B 156 and C 157 illustrate that following the majority of
minimum wage increases, aggregate employment levels increased and
unemployment levels decreased.
The misconception of the argument lies in its conclusion.
Employment growth is affected by a number of factors beside the min-
imum wage.' 58 These include economic conditions, compliance, and
coverage.' 59 In many areas, most notably domestic service, compli-
ance is considerably less than complete. 16 Because coverage was
originally limited to certain industries,' 6' aggregate data is mislead-
ing.' 62 Higher wages in the covered sector force workers to shift to
152. See supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
155. See S. REP. No. 6, supra note 22, at 24-25.
156. Id. at 11 (All figures are for civilian, nonagricultural labor.).
157. Id. at 23.
158. L. REYNOLDS, supra note 115, at 109; R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra note 25, at
81.
159. Ashenfelder & Smith, Compliance with the Minimum Wage Law, 87 J. POL. ECON.
333 (1979).
160. Id. at 350.
161. R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra note 25, at 81.
162. Id.
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TABLE B: HISTORICAL IMPACT OF MINIMUM WAGE INCREASES
Impact
Minimum
Year Wage
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
$2.30
2.65
2.90
3.10
3.35
3.35
Youth
Increase Unemployment Unemployment Total
(percent) (percent) (percent)(thousands) Employment
0 7.1 17.8 88,734
15 6.1 16.4 92,661
9.4 5.8 16.1 95,477
6.9 7.1 17.8 95,938
8.1 7.6 19.6 97,030
0 9.7 23.2 96,125
the uncovered sector and earn a lower wage.1 63 Employment may
increase but total income decreases.I 64 In addition to these factors,
overall economic conditions, most notably economic prosperity, often
TABLE C: UNEMPLOYMENT AND MINIMUM WAGE INCREASES
Increase in
Minimum Wage
Year (percent)
1949 87
1955 33
1961 15
1966 30
1974 25
1977 10
1982 0
Unemployment
(percent)
Before
mask the negative effects of an increased minimum wage. 16-
If these factors are considered, "changes in one or more of them
obscure the negative relationship between wages and the demand for
labor." 166 Furthermore, the impact of changes in the minimum wage
is often felt only after a time lag.I67 The substitution effect-switch-
ing from labor to capital-caused by the increased price of labor takes
time. The installation of equipment as a result of an increase in labor
costs often does not occur until a year or more after the effective date
163. See supra notes 101-14 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 101-14 and accompanying text..
165. R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra note 25, at 81. Indeed, Congress normally only
increases the minimum wage in times of prosperity such that this often masks the effects of the
increase. See id.
166. Id. at 79.
167. Id.
After
[Vol. 45:651
INCREASED MINIMUM WAGE
of the change in the wage.I6 Moreover, the impact of the new wage
often is delayed because economic conditions are prosperous and the
economy is expanding. Not until the business cycle turns downward
are the predicted results of marginal employees being either laid off or
not hired observed. 169
Graph 7170 depicts a model with uniform coverage17 1 and illus-
trates the fallacy in the argument that increasing the minimum wage
does not cause unemployment.
Graph 7 Minimum Wage Effects: Growing Demand
Real Wages
(W/P)w.w.
IF, ~i~ o -- ,--- --- lP I P
II
' D 0 D1
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E0 E1E1H
Employment (E)
In this graph, Do is the demand curve for low-skilled labor in
year 0, in which the real wage is Wo/Po and the employment level is
Eo. Assuming the absence of a change in the minimum wage, the
money wage and the price level both increase by the same percentage
over the next year. The real wage in year 1 (W1/P1) is the same as
that in year 0. Suppose that in year 1 two things occur. First, the
minimum wage rate is raised to W2 which is greater than W1 so that
the real wage increases to W2/P1. Second, because the economy is
168. Id. at 81.
169. Empirical studies of the effects of federal and state minimum wage increases amply
support the theoretical economic expectation that adverse employment results follow from
higher minimum wages, and that such results are likely to be felt during an economic
downturn if the minimum wage is raised during a period of full employment. See generally J.
PETERSON & C. STEWART, EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF MINIMUM WAGE RATES, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH 11 (1969).
170. R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra note 25, at 81.
171. Uniform coverage assumes that all jobs are subject to paying at least the minimum
wage. See supra notes 89-100 and accompanying text.
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expanding, the demand for low-skilled labor shifts to D1. The result
of these changes is that employment increases from EO to El.
Comparisons of the aggregate employment levels lead supporters
of an increased minimum wage to conclude that the increase has no
adverse employment effects.172 This simple before/after comparison,
however, is erroneous. 173 The appropriate inquiry should be directed
at actual employment levels: how the employment level in period 1
compares to the level that would have prevailed but for the increase in
the minimum wage.' 74 As a result of the increased demand, the
employment level should have been EJH. E1H is greater than El, the
actual level of employment in period 1, so that E1H less El represents
the loss of jobs caused by the minimum wage increase. In a growing
economy with complete coverage, the net effect of a one-time increase
in the minimum wage is to reduce the rate of growth of employ-
ment. 175 By focusing only on the actual employment growth, sup-
porters of the increase in the minimum wage misunderstand the
implications of the model and fail to address the adverse employment
effects of the increase. 176 The following examination of empirical
studies and historical analysis of minimum wage increases illustrates
this conclusion. 177
The Twenty-Five Cent Minimum of 1938: Two weeks after the
twenty-five cent per hour minimum wage became effective (this was
the initial requirement of the FLSA), the administrator of the FLSA
reported that between 30,000 and 50,000 persons became unemployed
due to the law. 178 As firms continued to adjust to the wage floor, they
substituted machinery for labor and weeded out inefficient workers. 1
79
The effect of this technological unemployment was offset by improved
business conditions and a boom in defense spending that masked the
real effect of the increase.' 80
The Seventy-Five Cent Minimum of 1949: Congress raised the
minimum wage from forty cents to seventy-five cents-an increase of
87.5%.' Contrary to predictions of increased unemployment,
unemployment fell from 5.9% in 1949 to 5.3% in 1950, and youth
172. See S. REP. No. 6, supra note 22, at 29.
173. R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra note 25, at 82.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See G. BLOOM & H. NORTHRUP, supra note 119, at 545; L. REYNOLDS, supra note
115, at 109.
178. G. BLOOM & H. NORTHRUP, supra note 119, at 545.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, Pub. L. No. 393, § 6, 63 Stat. 910, 912.
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unemployment decreased 1.2% in the same period.18 2 Total employ-
ment grew more than in the prior year when there was no increase in
the minimum wage. 18 3 Although these figures look appealing, the
economic benefits of the period were mainly due to the economic
upswing caused by the Korean War."8 4
The One Dollar Minimum of 1956: Congress raised the mini-
mum wage in 1955 to one dollar per hour-an increase of thirty-three
percent.' 5 The United States Chamber of Commerce warned that
"[1]ow paid workers who are covered by the law will [be] ... barred
from jobs by [the increase]."' 86 The aggregate effects of the increase
were that unemployment fell from 4.4% to 4.1%, youth unemploy-
ment increased slightly from 11.0% to 11.1%, and total employment
increased more in 1956 than in the two prior years.' 87 These figures,
however, are misleading. After the increase, the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics analyzed wages and employment in southern plants in five low-
wage branches of manufacturing.' The Bureau found that the earn-
ings increase of ten to twenty percent in these plants was accompanied
by an average eight percent decline in employment during the year
following the increase in the minimum wage.'8 9 Employment in
industries that had substantial employment rates at under one dollar
declined, even though the economy was strong.190 Sixteen of the high
impact industries suffered a ten to twenty-five percent drop in employ-
ment, with unskilled workers especially hard hit. ' 1
The 1961 Amendments: Congress increased the minimum wage
to $1.15 per hour in 1961 and to $1.25 per hour in 1963.192 The
amendments also expanded coverage to retail and service trades,
93
thereby effecting 3.6 million workers. During debate on the amend-
ments, the Chamber of Commerce again predicted gloom: "Many
retail and service employers have already predicted layoffs . . . if
brought under [the] coverage of the $1.25 [per hour] law ....
182. S. REP. No. 6, supra note 22, at 8.
183. Id.
184. G. BLOOM & H. NORTHRUP, supra note 119, at 545.
185. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1955, Pub. L. No. 381, § 3, 69 Stat. 711, 711.
186. S. REP. No. 6, supra note 22, at 8.
187. Id. at 8-9.
188. Effects of the $1.00 Minimum Wage in Five Industries, 15 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 492
(1958); see also Kaun, Minimum Wages, Factor Substitution, and the Marginal Producer, 43 Q.
J. ECON. 478 (1965); Peterson, Employment Effects of Minimum Wages, 18 J. POL. EON. 429
(1957).
189. Peterson, supra note 188, at 433.
190. G. BLOOM & H. NORTHRUP, supra note 119, at 545.
191. Id. (citations omitted).
192. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 5, 75 Stat. 65, 67.
193. Id.
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Whatever good might result from minimum wage legislation would be
far outweighed by the unemployment and inflation the legislation
would provoke."19 4 Evidence of the effects was misleading. Although
employment in retailing continued to expand, the increase occurred in
areas still not covered by the FLSA.' 95 In areas covered by the
FLSA, employment decreased. 19 6  In addition, although overall
unemployment fell from 6.7% to 5.5%, and overall employment
increased as compared to the prior year, employment in the covered
sector fell, dropping by thirty-two thousand jobs between October
1960 and June 1962.197
The 1966 Amendments: The 1966 amendments increased the
minimum wage to $1.60 per hour in two steps for workers already
covered by the law and in several steps for newly covered workers.'
98
The increases were enacted in a great period of prosperity and rising
employment. 199 Government sponsors of the amendments hailed the
results of the increase as a major contribution to the fight against pov-
erty.2°° A more careful examination of the data, however, reveals that
the consequences of the increase were not entirely beneficial.201 In
some newly affected industries, such as laundries and agriculture,
employment declined.202 In others, such as hotels, restaurants, and
hospitals, employment continued to expand.20 3
The 1974 and 1977 Amendments. In 1974, Congress amended
194. S. REP No. 6, supra note 22, at 9.
195. G. BLOOM & H. NORTHRUP, supra note 119, at 545.
196. See id. at 546 n.9.
197. See id. at 546 n.8.
198. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 301, 80 Stat. 830,
838.
199. See G. BLOOM & H. NORTHRUP, supra note 119, at 546 n.8.
200. During the period 1966 to 1968, unemployment fell from 3.8% to 3.6%, youth
unemployment fell from 12.8% to 12.7%, and employment increased by more than three
million workers. S. REP. No. 6, supra note 22, at 9. Labor market participation rates hit a
post-war high in 1969. Id. The increases raised the minimum wage to 55.8% of the average
hourly earnings, the highest relative level of the minimum wage to date. Id. These figures led
then-Secretary of Labor Hodgson to report to Congress that:
[I]n view of the overall economic trends, it is doubtful whether changes in the
minimum [wage] had any substantial impact on wage, price, or employment
trends. Of much greater significance, however, is the fact that the 15 cent boost
did help two million workers recover some of the purchasing power eroded by the
steady upward movement of prices which had started even before the enactment of
the 1966 amendments.
Id. at 10 (emphasis added) (quoting then-Secretary of Labor Shultz in a report to Congress in
1970).
201. G. BLOOM & H. NORTHRUP, supra note 119, at 546; see also J. PETERTSON & C.
STEWART, supra note 169, at 24.
202. G. BLOOM & H. NORTHRUP, supra note 119, at 546.
203. Id.
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the FLSA, increasing the minimum wage to $2.00 in 1974, $2.10 in
1975, and $2.30 in 1976.2o In 1977,'under the Carter Administra-
tion, the FLSA again was amended raising the minimum wage in a
series of steps to $3.35 an hour as of January 1, 1981 25 The increases
in the minimum wage since 1974 have had a serious impact on
employment of unskilled and teenage workers. 206 During this period,
overall unemployment rose from 5.5% to 7.6% between 1974 and
1976, although this was due in part to the 1975 recession. 20 7 Retail
employment increased during the same period by 655,000 jobs (a
5.2% increase).208 Contrary to a Chamber of Commerce predic-
tion,2 °9 total employment increased by 8,296,000 between 1977 and
198 1.210
204. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 1, 88 Stat. 55, 55.
Concerning these increases, one witness for the American Retail Federation testified that
retailers would be forced to "reduce the number of employees. The first ones to go would have
to be marginal employees we in many cases are carrying now. We would also have to suggest
retirement to employees who are no longer productive but who we are currently carrying." S.
REP. No. 6, supra note 22, at 10.
205. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-151, § 2, 91 Stat. 1245,
1245. In both the 1974 and 1977 amendments, Congress narrowly defeated attempts to
provide for a special subminimum wage for teenagers. See S. REP. No. 6, supra note 22, at 10.
206. Granlich, Impact of Minimum Wages on Other Wages, Employment and Family
Incomes, in 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 442 (A. Okun & G. Perry eds.
1976); see also Welch, supra note 103, at 285.
207. S. REP. No. 6, supra note 22, at 10.
208. Id.
209. In testimony before the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, a representative
of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce predicted that the proposed minimum wage increase would
result in about two million lost jobs. Id. The Chamber calculated a first year job loss of 40,000
of which 38,700 would be teenage jobs, and an increase in minority teenage unemployment
anywhere from 6% to 45% with a minimum wage of $2.65 in the first year of the increases.
Id.
210. Id. at 11.
The only decline in employment occurred in 1982, a year in which there was
no increase in the minimum wage. Employment increased 3,313,000 in 1977,
another year in which there was no increase, and it increased 3,927,000 in 1978,
the year a 15% increase of the minimum wage went into effect. Teenage
employment increased 382,000 in 1978, as compared to an increase of 352,000 in
1977 when there was no increase in the minimum wage. Minority teen
unemployment declined 1.8% in 1978 when the minimum wage reached $2.65,
instead of the 6-45% increase predicted by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
testimony in 1977.
Contrary to the testimony projecting that 5800 of the 29,000 convenience
stores would close if the minimum wage were increased, the number of
convenience stores increased by 4100 between 1977 and 1978, as compared to an
increase of 2000 between 1976 and 1977, a year in which there was no increase.
Retail employment also increased by 1,381,000 between the years 1977 and
1981. The only decline came in 1982, a year in which there was no increase in
the minimum wage. Similarly, retail employment increased in 1977 (a year with
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VI. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND STUDIES
Assuming that political pressure will always lead to minimum
wage increases, the effect of any increase on the homeless is deter-
mined by analyzing who wins and loses as a result of artificial wage
supports.21' Labor economists have devoted much effort to empiri-
cally studying the effects of minimum wage legislation on the employ-
ment levels of various age, race, and gender groups.
Studies and estimates abound for calculating the effect of increas-
ing the minimum wage.212 Most, if not all, conclude that there is a
disemployment effect borne primarily by low-income and teenage
workers.2 13 While their academic temperament makes economists
wont to disagree on any issue, in this case the disagreement is limited
to details of econometric simulation.214
A. Effect by Age Group
Most studies conclude that teenagers fare the worst from mini-
mum wage increases. 215 As a group, teenage labor can be character-
ized by inexperience, lack of advanced education, and equilibrium
no increase) by only 599,000 jobs, while it increased in 1978 (a year with a 15%
increase) by 765,000 jobs.
Id.
211. See supra Section IV.
212. See Brown, Gilroy & Kohen, The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Employment and
Unemployment, 20 J. ECON. LIT. 487 (1982) (surveying recent theoretical and empirical
literature on this topic). Economists have long been concerned with the impact of minimum
wage legislation on employment. For a survey of earlier work, see A. KAITZ, YOUTH
UNEMPLOYMENT AND MINIMUM WAGES (Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin No.1657,
1970); and J. PETERSON & C. STEWART, supra note 169. George Stigler's classic analysis,
published in 1946, was perhaps one of the first to predict adverse effects on employment.
Stigler, The Economics of Minimum Wage Legislation, 36 AM. ECON. REV. 358, 361 (1946).
213. See, e.g., R. BURNS, THE BUSINESS CYCLE IN A CHANGING WORLD 216-19 (N.Y.
Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res. 1969); M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 180-81 (1962);
D. HAMERMESH & A. REES, supra note 97, at 127; P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 393-94
(1973); Feldstein, The Economics of New Unemployment, 33 PUB. INTEREST 3, 14-16 (Fall
1973).
214. Brown, Gilroy & Kohen, supra note 212, at 487.
215. See Al-Salam, Quester & Welch, Some Determinants of the Level and Racial
Composition of Teenage Employment, in THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL MINIMUM WAGES (S.
Rottenberg ed. 1981); Cotterman, The Effects of Federal Minimum Wages on the Industrial
Distribution of Teenage Employment, in THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL MINIMUM WAGES, supra,
at 42; Mattila, The Impact of Minimum Wages on Teenage Schooling and on Part-Time/Full-
Time Employment of Youths, in THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL MINIMUM WAGES, supra, at 61;
Ragan, The Effect of a Legal Minimum Wage on the Pay and Employment of Teenage Students
and Nonstudents, in THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL MINIMUM WAGES, supra, at 11; Swindinsky,
Minimum Wages and Teenage Unemployment, 13 CANADIAN J. EcON. 158, 168 (1980).
These studies were conducted before the youth training wage was instituted and therefor did
not include the effects of the now-legislated teenage training wage. See supra note 12.
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wage rates below the minimum.216 Evidence is overwhelming that a
higher minimum wage reduces employment among people age sixteen
to nineteen in the United States.217 There is some evidence that
greater coverage of the minimum wage has had the same effect.21
Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen 19 conclude that teenage workers incur a
decline in employment between one and three percent as a result of a
ten percent increase in the minimum wage.220
Studies that provide estimates of the effect of the minimum wage
on young adults, ages twenty to twenty-four, show consistent nega-
tive employment effects and positive unemployment impacts.221 The
effects tend to be smaller than those estimated for teenagers, although
the effects vary somewhat across gender and racial groups. 2 22
The effect on adult employment of increasing the minimum wage
is uncertain. This is because the effects are better studied on groups
containing a relatively large percentage of workers who would have
earned less than the minimum wage in the absence of the mandated
wage floor. Teenagers, and to a lesser extent, young adult workers, fit
this description; adults generally do not. As a result, the increased
minimum wage could increase or reduce adult employment. In either
case, the effect 223 may be so small compared to total adult employ-
ment that it will not be detected with precision. 224
B. Effects in Low- Wage Industries
1. AGRICULTURE
The 1966 amendments to the FLSA provided for significant
increases in coverage among agricultural workers.22 5 The statutory
minimum wage for covered farm workers has risen in seven steps
216. D. HAMERMESH & A. REES, supra note 97, at 127.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Brown, Gilroy & Kohen, supra note 212, at 487.
220. Id. at 501. If, as one commentator suggests, one of the goals for the enactment of the
minimum wage was "to reduce youth employment and limit their competition with adults,"
this may be a desirable result. P. OSTERMAN, GETTING STARTED: THE YOUTH LABOR
MARKET 84 (1980). More youth enroll in school when the minimum wage increases-
probably because the attractiveness of schooling is enhanced when employment opportunities
are restricted by the higher minimum wage. Mattila, Youth Labor Markets, Enrollments and
Minimum Wages, 31 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 134 (1978).
221. Brown, Gilroy & Kohen, supra note 212, at 503.
222. D. HAMERMESH & A. REES, supra note 97, at 127.
223. Some adults may be displaced by the minimum wage while others benefit by remaining
employed at the higher wage.
224. Brown, Gilroy & Kohen, supra note 212, at 487.
225. The Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 103, 80 Stat.
830, 832.
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from one dollar an hour in February 1967 to eventual parity with
other covered workers at $2.65 in 1978. Current studies measuring
the impact of the minimum wage on employment in agriculture build
upon earlier econometric analyses of the farm labor market226 and
tend to support the hypothesis that increases in the minimum wage
result in adverse employment effects.227
In a 1981 aggregate time-series study of United States agriculture
over the 1946 to 1978 period, significant disemployment effects were
found, with the minimum wage reducing the number of hired farm
workers by sixty thousand.228 Other studies have found even larger
effects. For example, a 1972 study2 29 used annual data over the 1947
to 1970 period and estimated that the 1966 amendments reduced
hired farm employment by approximately eighteen percent from what
it would have been in the 1967 to 1970 period.230
In a more specialized study, Trapani and Moroney estimated the
effect of the 1966 FLSA amendments on employment of seasonal cot-
ton workers.231 The study, which was based on cross-section data
from fourteen cotton-producing states pooled during 1960 to 1966,
found that the extended minimum wage coverage accounted for fifty
percent of the decline in employment on cotton farms between 1967
and 1969.232 Predictably, the greatest effects were felt in regions
where wages, on average, were initially the lowest-the south-central
and southeastern states.233
2. RETAIL TRADE
The most thorough statistical study concerning retail trade con-
cludes that employment has been significantly curtailed as a result of
the 1961 and subsequent increases in the minimum wage.234 Using a
mixture of time-series regressions, forecasts of relative wages in retail
226. See generally Schuh, Econometric Investigation of the Market for Hired Farm Labor in
Agriculture, 44 J. FARM. ECON. 307 (1962); Trychniewicz & Schuh, Econometric Analysis of
the Agricultural Labor Market, 51 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 770 (1969).
227. For a survey of literature, see Gilroy, Minimum Wages and Agricultural Employment:
A Review of the Evidence, in 1982 INDUS. REL. RES. A. PROC. 78 (B. Demis ed.).
228. Gardner, What Have Minimum Wages Done in Agriculture?, in THE ECONOMICS OF
LEGAL MINIMUM WAGES, supra note 215, at 210.
229. Gardner, Minimum Wages and the Farm Labor Market, 54 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 473
(1972).
230. Id.
23 1. Trapani & Moroney, The Impact of Federal Minimum Wage Laws on Employment of
Seasonal Cotton Workers, in THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL MINIMUM WAGES, supra note 215,
at 233.
232. Id. at 236.
233. Id.
234. P. FLEISHER, MINIMUM WAGE REGULATION IN RETAIL TRADE 9 (1981).
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trade, and estimates of consumer demand equations, the study
inferred that during the 1960's, retail trade employment was five per-
cent lower than it otherwise would have been for each five percent
increase in the minimum wage.23 Further, the study found signifi-
cantly different effects among industries within the retail trade. For
instance, the minimum wage caused a negligible effect on department
store employment, while strongly affecting variety and food store
employment.
Other studies confirm that the minimum wage has a negative
effect on employment in retail trade. According to a United States
Department of Labor study, 236 employment in covered establishments
in the South fell by 10.6 % between June 1961 and June 1962, while
employment in uncovered establishments rose by 4.8%.237
3. SERVICE INDUSTRIES
The United States Department of Labor has reported on several
service industries in which minimum wage coverage was extended by
the 1966 FLSA amendments. 238 These industries include hospitals,
hotels and motels, and laundries and cleaning establishments. The
reports found no correlation between the imposition of the minimum
wage and employment. 239  The reports are, however, open to the
same criticism as is aggregate employment data. Brown, Gilroy, and
Kohen applied their formula to the same data and found that the min-
imum wage had a negative impact on employment in these industries.
They concluded that a ten percent increase in the minimum wage
resulted in a one percent reduction in employment.24
Gordon 241 focused on the private household service (housekeep-
ing) sector's response to the 1974 minimum wage coverage extension
by comparing the rate of change in employment of private household
235. Id.
236. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, REPORT SUBMI'FED TO THE CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 4(D) OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 40 (U.S.
GPO 1963).
237. Id. at 41.
238. See WAGE & HOUR & PUB. CONTRACT DIvs., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HOSPITALS: A
STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE APPLICATION OF MINIMUM WAGE AND
MAXIMUM HOURS STANDARDS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (1979); WAGE &
HOUR & PUB. CONTRACT DIVS., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HOTELS AND MOTELS: A STUDY OF
THE EFFECTS OF THE $1.00 MINIMUM WAGE UNDER THE FLSA (1968); WAGE & HOUR &
PUB. CONTRACT DIVS., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, LAUNDRY AND CLEANING SERVICES: A
STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF THE $1.00 MINIMUM WAGE UNDER THE FLSA (1969).
239. See supra note 225.
240. Brown, Gilroy & Kohen, supra note 212, at 520.
241. Gordon, The Impact of Higher Minimum Wages on Private Household Workers, in
THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL MINIMUM WAGES, supra note 215, at 191.
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workers before and after 1974. The Gordon study found precisely the
opposite of the predicted result that the minimum wage was having an
adverse effect on employment, concluding that since 1974, the long-
term decline in the number of household workers has slowed dramati-
cally.242 This conclusion is tainted, however, because the number of
hours worked was reduced, and compliance and enforcement of the
minimum wage was also lower.243
4. MANUFACTURING
The United States Department of Labor studied the effects of the
1956 increase in the minimum wage on several manufacturing indus-
tries.244 Although this increase came at a time of expansion, the study
concluded that industry growth was five percent lower in high-impact
firms than it was in low-impact firms.245 Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen,
using the same data, found a negative correlation between a ten per-
cent increase in the minimum wage and employment within the low-
wage manufacturing sector of 2.4%.246
More recent studies have found similar results. One analysis of
the impact of minimum wage changes on employment in seven low-
wage, nondurable goods manufacturing industries during the period
1947 to 1966, consistently found that increases in the minimum wage
led to reductions in employment. 247 A disemployment effect existed
for both number of workers and number of hours worked.2 4 These
results are supported by Boschen and Grossman,249 who found that a
ten percent increase in the minimum wage would reduce employment
in low-wage manufacturing jobs by about one percent.250
C. The Effect on the Macro Economy
In 1987, the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources
received testimony and accompanying studies when it considered Sen-
ate Bill 837 which would have increased the minimum wage to
242. Id. at 203.
243. Id. at 206-08.
244. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, STUDIES OF THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE $1.00 MINIMUM
WAGE (1959).
245. Id. at 9.
246. Brown, Gilroy & Kohen, supra note 212, at 521.
247. Zucker, Minimum Wages and the Long-Run Elasticity of Demand for Low- Wage
Labor, 87 Q.J. ECON. 267 (1973).
248. Id. at 278.
249. Boschen & Grossman, The Federal Minimum Wage, Employment, and Inflation, in
REPORT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE STUDY COMMISSION 19 (U.S. G.P.O. 1981).
250. Id.
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$4.68.251 One study submitted by the United States Chamber of Com-
merce estimated that, under the bill, 1.9 million jobs would be lost by
1995 .252 The study concluded that through the first three years there
would be a loss of 550,000 jobs, resulting in an increase in unemploy-
ment of 0.4%.253 A National Chamber Foundation study relied on
statistical relationships summarized by Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen in
their 1982 publication concerning the employment effects of the mini-
mum wage.254 The study concluded that as a result of the proposed
minimum wage increase, 750,000 jobs would be lost after the first
three years of the increase.255
The Congressional Budget Office ("CBO")2 56 prepared estimates
on the impact of an earlier proposal (H.R. 2257) increasing the mini-
mum wage. It found that H.R. 2 would cause a loss of approximately
125,000 to 250,000 jobs by 1992, with the most likely estimate falling
toward the low end of that range.258 The CBO concluded that a ten
percent increase in the minimum wage would result in approximately
a one to two percent decline in teenage employment, and have little
effect on young adults.259 Despite this loss in employment, the CBO
concluded that the aggregate earnings of low-wage workers would rise
because the additional earnings received by those who would be paid
251. Minimum Wage Restoration Act of 1987: Hearings on S. 837 Before the Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1987).
252. Id. at 12.
253. Id. Another Chamber of Commerce study received by the Committee concluded that
through the same three years of the bill, total job loss would exceed 750,000. Id.
254. Id.
255. The Chamber study has been criticized for its reliance on outdated statistical
relationships summarized by Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen, for failing to account for the
declining percentage of the workforce made up by minimum wage workers, for ignoring the
decline in the supply of teenage and young adult labor, and for not considering the impact of
States which have already increased their state minimum wages above the federal minimum
wage. Id. at 24.
256. The CBO was created in 1974 to provide Congress with basic budget data and to
prepare studies on budget related areas. Congressional Budget Act, Pub. L. 93-344, 88 Stat.
297-332 (1974) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 601 (1988)).
257. 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1989). H.R. 2 proposed to raise the minimum wage in stages
from the current level of $3.35 per hour to $3.85 per hour in 1990, $4.25 per hour in 1991, and
$4.65 per hour in 1992. Id. This was vetoed by President Bush. Veto of H.R. 2, H.R. Doc.
No. 71, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989).
258. Minimum Wage Controversy: Pro & Con, supra note 12, at 135. When called upon to
calculate a similar estimate for an earlier proposal to increase the minimum wage, the CBO
noted that "any attempt at quantifying the employment impact of increases in the minimum
wage is subject to a wide range of error. If anything, estimates are now even more uncertain
than usual because of special circumstances." Id. These special circumstances (not taken into
account by the CBO) include states in which the minimum wage is already above the federal
minimum, the expected decline in teenage and young adult populations, and the continued
decline in the percentage of hourly workers who are paid minimum wage. Id.
259. Id. at 137.
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higher wages would exceed the losses caused by lower employment.2so
In addition, the CBO estimated the H.R.2 would increase inflation by
about 0.1% to 0.3% per year during the phase-in period. 261  The CBO
study is in sharp contrast with a study by Krumm and Chao262 which
suggests that the ripple effect 263 on wages, caused by increasing the
minimum wage, will increase inflation at a higher rate.26
Aside from the CBO estimate, the most influential study con-
cerning minimum wage and employment concerns the effects of mini-
mum wage policy in Puerto Rico.265  The policy considered by the
study occurred in the mid-1970's, when the government of Puerto
Rico supported periodic increases in the island's minimum wage until
it reached parity with that of the United States.266 The target date for
parity was 1980.267 At the time, differential industry-wide minimum
wages were in effect.268  The statutory minimum wage was eighty-
three percent of average hourly earnings in manufacturing in Puerto
Rico as compared to forty-four percent in the United States. 269 The
amendment of the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1974, which provided
for automatic annual increases in minimum wage in Puerto Rico until
reaching the United States statutory level, was instrumental to this
260. Id. The CBO estimate was based on the findings and methodologies of recent studies
that have examined the economic impact of the minimum wage. The CBO further concluded
that the responses in employment were found mainly in teenage workers and, to a lesser extent,
for young adults between the ages of 20 and 24. Id. These findings are in contrast with the
higher disemployment effects of minimum wage increases during the 1960's and 1970's. Id.
The CBO cited several reasons why the loss of jobs caused by an increase in the minimum
wage in the current economic and demographic situation would be smaller. These included:
(1) fewer teenage workers than in earlier periods (for example, in 1978 and 1979 there were 9.6
million teenagers in the labor force compared with approximately eight million today); (2) the
teenage unemployment rate is lower today than in the past; and (3) there are fewer hourly
workers in the aggregate working at the minimum wage. Id.
261. Id.
262. Krum & Chao, The Ripple Effect of the Proposed Minimum Wage Increase, 10 GOV'T
UNION REV. 27 (1989).
263. "Ripple effect" refers to the wage increase that occurs when workers senior and more
experienced than minimum wage workers command higher wages to maintain the prior wage
differentials intended to recognize their greater value to the employer; the more the minimum
wage increases, the greater the number of individuals whose compensation must be adjusted to
maintain their relative wage differentials. Id.
264. Id. at 31.
265. Santiago, Closing the Gap: The Employment and Unemployment Effects of Minimum
Wage Policy in Puerto Rico, 23 J. DEV. ECON. 293 (1986). This study is particularly important
in determining the effects of the increased minimum wage on the homeless because it focuses
on a relatively low wage area rather than a particular demographic group such as the teenage
population. Id.
266. Id. at 294.
267. Id. at 296.
268. Id.
269. Id.
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policy. 270
By the end of the 19,70's, a number of changes were apparent in
the Puerto Rican economy.27I Average wages were rising less rapidly
than the minimum wage increases.272 Predictably, labor force partici-
pation was highly concentrated in the covered industries.27 a
Although these jobs became more competitive, workers were able to
remain outside the labor force while they searched for these job due to
increases in federal government transfers.274 Most importantly, the
unemployment rate increased to unprecedented levels, reaching over
twenty percent by the end of the decade, although this was due at
least in part to recessions in the Puerto Rican economy in 1974 to
1975 and 1979 to 1980.275 It is noteworthy that the disemployment
effects of the minimum wage increase were not experienced uniformly
across industries.276 The groups most affected were those with lower
average wages 277 and employment expanded in those industries char-
acterized by high wages, i.e., high-productivity occupations.278
VII. THE EFFECT OF INCREASING THE MINIMUM WAGE
ON THE HOMELESS
The increase in the minimum wage will affect the homeless both
directly and indirectly. Those homeless who are currently employed
at the minimum wage will lose their jobs if their productivity is not
high enough to offset the increased cost to the employer. As a result,
these workers will either become unemployed or will be forced to
accept lower paying jobs in the uncovered sector. On-the-job training
could offset this result. Empirical evidence, however, shows that the
minimum wage tends to discourage on-the-job training, especially
among lower educational levels and lower wage groups.279
The disemployment effect is magnified by the restructuring of the
economy and the resulting decline in manufacturing and retail jobs,
and a rise in white-collar professional jobs that displace many low-
270. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 2, 88 Stat. 55, 55.
271. Santiago, supra note 265, at 294.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. These included unemployment compensation and a federal food stamp program.
Id.
275. Id. at 295.
276. Id.
277. This translates into those with low marginal productivities. See supra notes 115-21
and accompanying text.
278. Santiago, supra note 265, at 260.
279. Leighton & Mincer, The Effects of Minimum Wages on Human Capital Formation, in
THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL MINIMUM WAGES, supra note 215, at 155, 171.
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income workers as well as the low-wage workers who are unable to
adapt .28  The increased minimum wage's negative impact on on-the-
job training prevents adaption to the shifting economy. The results,
developed by Olwen Hufton28 to describe the subsistence strategies of
the poor in eighteenth-century France, are "economies of makeshift"
in which the poor managed chiefly "by dint of their own ingenuity
and resiliency. '28 2
Another factor which must be recognized is the myriad other
social and practical handicaps the homeless must overcome to suc-
ceed in the job market.283 The homeless are afflicted with more
handicaps than other low-wage workers. 284 The daily uncertainty
about shelter ranks among the most burdensome.28 5 In addition,
homeless people are disproportionately affected by physical illness
and social problems.28 6
Section III characterized the homeless as primarily employed at
non-minimum wage jobs or as unemployed. The increased minimum
wage will also affect this group. As was shown in the discussion con-
cerning the dual labor market, an increased minimum wage will
depress the uncovered sector. This translates into a reduction in
income for the homeless employed in these jobs. Additionally, those
already unemployed will face greater competition for both minimum
wage and non-minimum wage jobs, thereby reducing the likelihood of
finding employment.
VIII. SUPPLEMENTS TO INCREASING THE MINIMUM WAGE
There are several other methods of reducing poverty by increas-
ing wages that do not have the negative impacts associated with the
minimum wage. Given that the American political climate seems to
be destined to incorporate the minimum wage in its economy, these
other methods should be considered in combination with the mini-
mum wage.
One alternative method of raising wages is through wage subsi-
280. Hopper, Susser & Conover, supra note 67, at 211; see also C. HOCH & R. SLAYTON,
NEW HOMELESS AND OLD 176 (1989).
281. Hopper, Susser & Conover, supra note 67, at 213 (citing 0. HuFrON, THE POOR IN
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY FRANCE, 1750-1789 (1974). The practice of economies of makeshift
included "an extra job, seasonal migration, turning the children out to beg, [and] involvement
in some semi-nefarious practice such as smuggling or prostitution." Id.
282. Id. at 216.
283. See generally C. HocH & R. SLAYTON, supra note 280, at 178.
284. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
285. Id.
286. Id.
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dies.287 A wage subsidy works by giving heads of low-wage families a
government subsidy equal to a percentage of the difference between
their money wage and some targeted amount. In theory, a wage sub-
sidy is ideal because it can be carefully targeted to only those workers
who need their wages boosted, as opposed to all minimum wage earn-
ers, many of whom are not poor. It would also increase the rewards
of work and increase employment, rather than reduce it, as raising the
minimum wage does, by increasing the incentives to work. The main
problem associated with wage subsidies is with administrative difficul-
ties.288 Employers would have to report both hours and earnings.
Both employees and employers would have an incentive to lie, claim-
ing that the wage rate was lower and that the hours worked were
higher than they actually were. In addition, employers are reluctant
to hire workers receiving a governmental subsidy.289
The negative income tax ("NIT") is another alternative. It is a
type of welfare program involving cash transfers to low-income fami-
lies.29° In its pure form, any family with a sufficiently low income
would be eligible to receive cash assistance. The NIT is distinguished
by the way transfers are related to the level of income: the greater the
income of a family, the lower the transfer.
Table D is an example of a hypothetical NIT:291
TABLE D: OPERATION OF NEGATIVE INCOME TAXES
Before Transfer Total Disposable
Income Transfer Income
$ 0 $4000 $4000
1000 3500 4500
2000 3000 5000
3000 2500 5500
4000 2000 6000
5000 1500 6500
6000 1000 7000
7000 500 7500
8000 0 8000
287. Wage subsidy proposals have a long history. See, e.g., JoBS FOR DISADVANTAGED
WORKERS: THE ECONOMICS OF EMPLOYMENT SUBSIDIES 1 (R. Havemen & J. Palmer eds.
1982).
288. R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra note 25, at 117.
289. Id.
290. For a complete discussion of negative income taxes, see C. GREEN, NEGATIVE TAXES
AND THE POVERTY PROBLEM (1967).
291. E. BROWNING & J. BROWNING, supra note 89, at 529.
1990-1991]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
In the hypothetical, the transfer is reduced by fifty cents for each
additional dollar earned until the cut-off point is reached.292 The rate
at which the transfer is reduced is called the benefit reduction rate, or
the marginal tax rate.293 Reducing transfers as income rises
guarantees that the neediest families receive the most help.
There are two problems with the NIT: (1) its effect on work
incentive; and (2) its budgetary effect. 294 To examine the way a NIT
affects the incentive to work, the income-leisure choice of workers
must be considered. 295 Economic theory suggests that both the
income effect and the substitution effect of the NIT encourage less
work while at the same time increasing total income received.296
Exactly how much the work effort will decline depends both on the
specific design of the program and on the preferences of the recipients.
Recall that to the worker, both income and leisure (nonwork) are
desirable economic goods and that a change in the budget line relating
income and leisure affects a worker's choice through income and
substitution effects.
The income effect results because a cash transfer enriches the
recipient, enabling him to work less. The substitution effect of the
NIT relates to the way it reduces benefits as a worker's earnings rise.
The marginal tax rate under the NIT reduces the net contribution to
income that comei from working additional hours. For example, if a
worker's wage rate is four dollars an hour under the hypothetical
NIT, working an additional hour adds four dollars to earnings but
results in a two dollars reduction in the transfer; the net gain
associated with the extra hour's work is only two dollars. As a result,
the relative cost of consuming leisure-the income sacrificed by not
working-is reduced from four dollars an hour to two dollars an
hour. The resulting reduction in the worker's net wage rate creates an
incentive to substitute leisure for income.
In contrast to the NIT, the earned income tax credit ("EITC") 297
rewards work by low-paid workers. EITC benefits start from a zero
base and grow as earnings grow, up to some limit. Conversely, the
292. If poverty is the targeted problem, a cut-off point would be at the poverty threshold.
293. E. BROWNING & J. BROWNING, supra note 89, at 529.
294. Id. at 530.
295. Id. at 531.
296. Id. at 532.
297. A modest EITC is already in place in the current tax system. 26 U.S.C. § 32 (1988).
Some might agree that expanding it would be simple. Another type of tax program is the New
Jobs Tax Credit ("NJTC"), which offers a tax credit of 50% of the first $4,200 of wages per
employee for increases in employment of more than two percent over the previous year. See
Bishop, Employment in Construction and Distribution Industries: The Impact of the New Jobs
Tax Credit, in STUDIES IN LABOR MARKETS 209 (S. Rosen ed. 1981).
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NIT starts high and is reduced as earnings grow.298 Economists favor
the EITC because it provides a greater incentive to work at higher
levels, at least until the phase-out level.
The basic EITC works as follows. Families with low earnings
gain tax credits for each dollar they earn. Under current law, families
with earnings below $6,200 per year receive tax credits of fourteen
cents for each dollar they are paid. For example, a worker who earns
$5,000 gets an additional $700 in tax credits. Since the tax credits are
refundable, the worker's effective earnings are $5,700. When earnings
reach $6,200, the worker receives the maximum credit of $868. For
those families with incomes over $9,840, the credit is then reduced by
ten cents for each dollar earned. Thus, the only real incentive or
value problem with the EITC does not occur until the family reaches
a level that can be set above the poverty level.
Currently, the EITC is low enough that it roughly offsets only
the taxes a working person will pay into the Social Security system.2 99
Part of the minimum wage compromise between Congress and the
Bush Administration was to increase the EITC.3o ° Because only low-
income families benefit from the EITC, it seems a more efficient way
of helping the working poor.
The combination of an increased minimum wage and an
expansion of the EITC appears to be a giant step in solving at least the
economic aspects of the homeless problem. 30 1 David Ellwood
provides an example of this in his work entitled, Poor Support.302 This
model, Making Work Pay-A Simple Plan,303 is based on two simple
changes that could have been implemented in 1986: the minimum
wage increasing to $4.40 an hour, and the EITC roughly doubling to
a thirty percent credit up to $ 9 ,000.3o' Table E30 5 illustrates the
result.
298. In essence, an NIT is a guaranteed minimum income in disguise, and an EITC is a
wage subsidy in disguise.
299. See Help, at Last, for the Working Poor, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1989, at B20, col. 1.
300. Id.
301. This combination reduces budgetary problems because of lower governmental outlays
under the tax credit. See id.
302. D. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT (1988).
303. Id. at 119.
304. Id.
305. Id.
1990-1991]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
TABLE E: THE EARNINGS, INCOME, AND WAGES OF A MINIMUM-
WAGE WORKER UNDER THE CURRENT SITUATION AND UNDER
THE MAKING WORK PAY PROPOSAL
Making Work
Earnings, Income, and Wages Current Situation Pay Proposal
Earnings3° 6  $6,700 $ 8,800
Less Soc. Sec. taxes 479 629
Plus EITC 868 2,640
Total Income 7,089 10,811
Minimum Wage 3.35 4.40
Effective Wage 3.54 5.41
Various artificial wage supports like the NIT and the EITC,
however effective, only treat low wages and/or underemployment
instead of curing them. Without any long-term policy to aid the
homeless, the various economic factors causing and stemming from
homelessness will only reinforce and perpetuate themselves.
Subsidized job training of the homeless is one long-term policy that
could enable the homeless to begin or resume a steady path of
earnings, thereby reducing dependance on welfare and other
governmental services.30 7 It is especially effective in counteracting the
predicted job loss of low-skilled workers due to the increase in the
minimum wage.3 °8 Further, unless unemployment is very low,
employers are unlikely to provide training to the most disadvantaged,
least-educated members of the work force, 3°9 a category that many
homeless fall into.
Subsidized on-the-job training can overcome the stifling effect
that the minimum wage has on job training. During the late 1970's
and early 1980's, the major government training programs for adults
were funded under the Comprehensive Employment and Training
306. This category assumes 2,000 hours of work.
307. See D. HAMERMESH & A. REES, supra note 97, at 88.
308. There are, however, arguments that suggest that subsidized job training is not
economically efficient. Those who are offered subsidized training may merely displace other
workers with similar backgrounds who are not given the training. Moreover, the increased
number of qualified workers will place a downward pressure on wages, thereby reducing real
income. See R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra note 25, at 119. Where the private rate of
return to those receiving the training may be large, the social rate of return is smaller because
there is little net addition of skills to the work force. D. HAMERMESH & A. REES, supra note
97, at 88. According to this view, the program only shuffles training opportunities around
within the low-skilled work force. Id. It is also argued that training will have little value if
aggregate demand is insufficient to provide steady jobs for the workers after they are trained.
Id. The government could increase the skill level of the population more if it maintained high
aggregate demand and thus tried to create jobs directly. Id.
309. D. HAMERMESH & A. REES, supra note 97, at 88.
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Act ("CETA"). 310 This was replaced in 1982 by the Job Training
Partnership Act ("JTPA").1 I These programs have proved effective
in increasing the probability that the person trained would remain
employed.312
For the unemployed homeless, remedial training also is needed
to assist them into the economic mainstream.31 a Many of the
unemployed homeless either have no marketable skills or have been
displaced by changes in the nature of the economy. Remedial training
can be achieved through combinations of federal, state, and local
programs. Although they exist today, they have one major drawback:
they provide no monetary support while the trainee is out of the
workforce.314 Without this stipend, the unemployed are forced to find
subsistence jobs and forego the training.315
IX. CONCLUSION
It is important to remember the functional purpose of the mini-
mum wage. In a 1981 letter to then-President Reagan and Congress
from the Chairman of the Minimum Wage Study Commission,316 the
Commission Chairman noted that:
The purpose of the [FLSA] was and is to establish a floor
below which wages would not fall, a floor which is adequate to
support life and a measure of human dignity. It is a laudable legis-
lative effort to ensure a just wage in return for a day's labor.
That the minimum wage has not brought us to the Earthly
Paradise may be a disappointment, but it should not be a surprise.
That it has provided a working floor below which wages would
have gone in its absence and have not gone because of it, suggests
that it has done what it was intended to. May that be said of each
of us.
3 1 7
There is no question that the minimum wage has some place in
310. Pub. L. 93-302, 87 Stat. 839 (1973) (replaced by Job Training Partnership Act of 1982,
29 U.S.C. § 1501 (1988)).
311. Pub. L. 97-300, 96 Stat. 1322 (1982) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 1501 (1988)). For
a thorough description of employment and training programs in the United States through the
1960's and 1970's, see S. LEVITAN, G. MAGNUM & R. MARSHALL, HUMAN RESOURCES AND
LABOR MARKETS (1981).
312. See Bassi, Estimating the Effect of Training Programs with Nonrandom Selection, 66
REP. ECON. STAT. 36 (1984).
313. See generally COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, TRAINING AND JOBS FOR
THE URBAN POOR 14 (1970); F. RIESSMAN, STRATEGIES AGAINST POVERTY 89 (1969).
314. See, e.g., BARRY UNIVERSITY, supra note 82, at 24.
315. Id.
316. The 1977 amendments created the Minimum Wage Study Commission to examine the
impact of the FLSA. See supra note 21.
317. S. REP. No. 6, supra note 22, at 12.
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the American economy-to prevent the unfair exploitation of work-
ers. When viewed in that light, it seems to be of value. But when
viewed as a measure to fight poverty, and for the purposes of this
Comment to fight homelessness, it seems inefficient at best.
As shown in Section III of this Comment, the majority of mini-
mum wage earners are neither poor nor homeless. Additionally, the
majority of minimum wage earners are not the primary wage earners
in a household. Therefore, if the extended purpose of the minimum
wage is to aid in the fight against poverty and homelessness, a more
targeted approach, concentrating on only those in need of assistance,
is better suited. Moreover, as Section IV illustrated, the majority of
employed poor and homeless are employed in primarily minimum
wage jobs. If policies are not explored to aid this majority, their
plight will only continue.
The effect that the increased minimum wage will have on the
homeless who earn the minimum wage is uncertain. There will cer-
tainly be winners and losers. Those who maintain their jobs at higher
wages obviously benefit, while those who become unemployed or are
forced out of covered sector jobs into lower paying jobs in the uncov-
ered sector lose as a result of the increase. Additionally, those unem-
ployed whose prospects of employment are diminished because of an
increased supply of labor and those who leave the labor market are
also losers. Today, empirical evidence of these effects is lacking and is
worthy of further study. The abundance of related data on minimum
wage effects suggests that because homeless minimum wage earners
are characteristically employed in high-impact industries, they will be
affected disproportionately worse than other minimum wage earners.
When employers are faced with having to pay higher wages, evidence
proves that they reduce employment by eliminating the least produc-
tive workers. This could be offset if firms increased the productivity
of their workers through job training-but studies prove that this
does not occur.
However noble a notion raising the minimum wage to fight
homelessness is, it must be viewed in practical terms. It is not the
most efficient method of curing the economic causes of homelessness.
It is, however, the least expensive to the government. Conversely,
various tax programs and wage subsidies offer solutions with minimal
adverse effects on employment and greater efficiency. These pro-
grams, however, are expensive, especially in an era of deficits. Home-
less advocates should not glorify the increase in the minimum wage as
a victory against poverty and homelessness. Rather, they should per-
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suade Congress to develop the necessary broad-based programs to
minimize the harsh results of an increased minimum wage.
DARYL MARC SHAPIRO
